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Abstract
Local differential privacy is a widely studied restriction on distributed algorithms that collect
aggregates about sensitive user data, and is now deployed in several large systems. We initiate
a systematic study of a fundamental limitation of locally differentially private protocols: they
are highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. While any algorithm can be manipulated by
adversaries who lie about their inputs, we show that any non-interactive locally differentially
private protocol can be manipulated to a much greater extent. Namely, when the privacy level
is high or the input domain is large, an attacker who controls a small fraction of the users in
the protocol can completely obscure the distribution of the users’ inputs. We also show that
existing protocols differ greatly in their resistance to manipulation, even when they offer the
same accuracy guarantee with honest execution. Our results suggest caution when deploying
local differential privacy and reinforce the importance of efficient cryptographic techniques for
emulating mechanisms from central differential privacy in distributed settings.
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1 Introduction
Many companies rely on aggregates and models computed on sensitive user data. The past few
years have seen a wave of deployments of systems for collecting sensitive user data via local differential
privacy [EGS03], notably Google’s RAPPOR [EPK14] and Apple’s deployment in iOS [App17].
These protocols satisfy differential privacy [DMNS06], a widely studied restriction that limits the
information leaked due to any one user’s presence in the data. Furthermore, the privacy guarantee is
enforced locally, by a user’s device, without reliance on the correctness of other parts of the system.
Local differential privacy is attractive for deployments for several reasons. The trust assumptions
are relatively weak and easily explainable to novice users. In contrast to centralized differential
privacy, the data collector never collects raw data, which reduces the legal, ethical, and technical
burden of safeguarding the data. Moreover, local protocols are typically simple and highly efficient
in terms of communication and computation.
Figure 1: The structure of a (non-interactive) local protocol.
Despite these benefits, local protocols have significant limitations when compared to private
algorithms in the central model, in which data are collected and processed by a trusted curator.
The most discussed limitation is larger error for the same level of privacy (e.g., [DMNS06, KLN+08,
BNO11]). In this paper, we initiate a systematic study of a different limitation that we show to be
equally fundamental:
Locally differentially private protocols are highly vulnerable to manipulation.
While any algorithm can be manipulated by users who lie about their data, we demonstrate
that local algorithms can be manipulated to a far greater extent. As the level of privacy or the
size of the input domain increase, an adversary who corrupts a vanishing fraction of the users can
effectively prevent the protocol from collecting any useful information about the data of the honest
users. This result can be interpreted as showing that local differential privacy opens up new, more
powerful avenues for poisoning attacks—poisoning the private messages can be far more destructive
than poisoning the data itself.
Prior work had already noted that a specific protocol—Warner’s randomized response [War65]—
is vulnerable to manipulation [AJL04, MN06]. In contrast, our work shows that manipulation is
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unavoidable for any noninteractive local protocol that solves any one of a few basic problems to
sufficiently high accuracy, and systematically study the optimal degree of manipulation of local
protocols for each problem. These problems capture computing means and histograms, identifying
heavy-hitters, and estimating the distribution of users’ data. We also show that existing protocols
differ greatly in their vulnerability to manipulation.
Our results suggest caution when deploying locally differentially private protocols. If manipulation
is a potential concern, then there should be mechanisms for enforcing the correctness of users’
randomization (for instance, via software attestation). Our results also reinforce the importance of
efficient cryptographic techniques that emulate central-model algorithms in a distributed setting, such
as multiparty computation [DKM+06] or shuffling [BEM+17, CSU+19]. Such protocols already have
significant accuracy benefits, and our results highlight their much higher resilience to manipulation.
Why are Local Protocols Vulnerable to Manipulation? Intuitively, because local differential
privacy requires that each user’s message is almost independent of their data, large changes in the
users’ data induce only small changes in the distribution of the messages. As a result, the aggregator
must be highly sensitive to small changes in the distribution of messages. That is, an adversary who
can cause small changes in the distribution of messages can make the messages appear as if they
came from users with very different data, forcing the aggregator to change its output dramatically.
We can see how this occurs using the classic example of randomized response. Here each user’s
has data xi ∈ {±1}. For roughly 2ε-local differential privacy, each user outputs
yi =
{
xi with probability
1+ε
2
−xi with probability 1−ε2
so that the expectation of yi is εxi. The aggregator can compute an unbiased estimate of the mean
1
n
∑n
i=1 xi by returning
1
n
∑n
i=1
yi
ε .
In order to extract the relatively weak signal and make the estimate unbiased, the aggregator
scales up each message yi by a factor of
1
ε , which increases the influence of each message. Specifically,
an adversary who can flip m of the messages yi from −1 to +1 will increase the aggregator’s output
by 2mεn . A simple consequence of our work is that any noninteractive LDP protocol for computing
the average of bits is similarly vulnerable to manipulation.
1.1 A Representative Example: Frequency Estimation
We can more fully illustrate our work results through the example of frequency estimation.
Consider a protocol whose goal is to collect the frequency of words typed by users on their keyboard.
We assume that there are n users, and each user contributes only a single word to the dataset,
so each user’s word is an element of [d] = {1, . . . , d} where d is the size of the dictionary. The
goal of the protocol to estimate the vector consisting of the frequency of each word as accurately
as possible. In this example, we measure accuracy in the `1 norm (or, equivalently, in statistical
distance or total variation distance): if v ∈ Rd is the frequency vector whose entries vj are the
fraction of users whose data takes the value j, and vˆ is the estimated frequency vector, then the
error is ‖v − vˆ‖1 =
∑d
j=1 |vj − vˆj |.
4
Figure 2: A general manipulation attack.
We consider a general attack model where the
adversary is able to corrupt a set of m out of
the n users’ devices, and can instruct these users
to send arbitrary messages, possibly in a coordi-
nated fashion. The corruptions are unknown to
the aggregator running the protocol to prevent the
aggregator from ignoring the messages of the cor-
rupted users. In this, and all of our examples, the
adversary’s goal is to make the error as large as
possible—exactly opposite to goal of the protocol.
Baseline Attacks. In order for the attack to be a
concern, the adversary has to be able to introduce
more error than what would otherwise exist in the
protocol, and the attack should be specific to local differential privacy. In particular, we say the
attack is non-trivial if it introduces more error than the following trivial baselines:
No Manipulation. The adversary could choose not to manipulate the messages at all, in which
case the protocol will still incur some error due to the fact that it must ensure local differential
privacy. For example, it is known that an optimal ε-differentially private local protocol for frequency
estimation introduces error ≈√d2/ε2n [DJW13a].
Input Manipulation. The adversary could have the corrupted users change only their inputs.
That is, the corrupted users could honestly carry out the protocol as if their data were some arbitrary
x′i instead of xi (see Figure 3). Since the corrupted users control an m/n fraction of the data, they
can skew the overall distribution by m/n. This attack applies to any protocol, private or not.
Figure 3: An input-manipulation attack.
These baselines make sense in the context of
any task, and we will use the bounds for these
baselines to calibrate the effectiveness of attacks
for other problems (not just frequency estimation)
in the next section.
Our Manipulation Attack. In Section 4, we
describe and analyze an attack that skews the
overall distribution by ≈ m
√
d
εn , for any noninter-
active ε-differentially private local protocol. This
attack introduces much larger error—by roughly a
factor of
√
d
ε —than input manipulation, and thus
shows specifically that locally private protocols
are highly vulnerable to manipulation. Moreover,
when the adversary corrupts m ≈ √nd (which is much smaller than n for any interesting choice of
n and d) users, then they can significant reduce the accuracy of the protocol. We can also show
that our attack is near-optimal by demonstrating that achieves optimal error in the absence of
manipulation, and cannot be manipulated by more than ≈ m
√
d
εn .
The Breakdown Point. Another way to understand the effectiveness of a manipulation attack
is through what we call the breakdown point—the maximum fraction of corrupted users that any
protocol can tolerate while still ensuring non-trivial accuracy. Our attack demonstrates that, for
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frequency estimation, the breakdown point is roughly ε√
d
. That is, that this number of corrupted
users can skew the distribution by Ω(1) in `1 norm, while any two frequency vectors have `1 distance
at most 1. Thus, when ε is small or d is large, an attacker who controls just a vanishing fraction of
the users can prevent the protocol from achieving any non-trivial accuracy guarantee.
1.2 Summary of Results
In this work, we construct two manipulation attacks on locally differentially private protocols,
and use these attacks to derive lower bounds on the degree of manipulation allowed by local
protocols for a variety of tasks (including the frequency estimation example above). We also study
the resilience of specific protocols to manipulation. For each problem, we give a protocol that is
asymtpotically optimal with respect to both ordinary accuracy (i.e., without manipulation) and
resilience to manipulation. We also show that popular protocols for most tasks are much less
resistant to manipulation than optimal ones.
Below, we first discuss the attacks informally, and then discuss the set of problems to which they
apply. We defer details of the attack model to Section 2.2. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Manipulation Attacks for Binary Data. Our first attack concerns the simplest problem in
local differential privacy—computing a mean of bits. Each user has data xi ∈ {0, 1}, and we assume
that each xi is drawn independently from the Bernoulli distribution Ber(p), meaning xi = 1 with
probability p and xi = 0 with probability 1− p. Our goal is to estimate the mean p as accurately as
possible. More generally, we could allow the users to have arbitrary data x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1} and try
to estimate 1n
∑n
i=1 xi. For the purposes of attacks, considering the former distributional version
will make our results stronger.
Without manipulation, this problem is solved by the classical randomized response proto-
col [War65], which achieves optimal error Θ( 1
ε
√
n
). As we discussed in the introduction, one can
show that the error of randomized response increases to Θ( 1
ε
√
n
+ mεn) when an adversary corrupts
m of the users. We show that no protocol can improve this bound.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For every ε-differentially private local protocol Π for n users with input
domain {0, 1}, there is an attack M corrupting m users such that Π cannot distinguish between the
following cases:
1. The data is drawn from Ber(p0) for p0 =
1
2 and Π has been manipulated by M .
2. The data is drawn from Ber(p1) for p1 =
1
2 + Θ(
1
ε (
1√
n
+ mn )) and Π has not been manipulated.
This theorem shows that, when the data is drawn from Ber(p) for unknown p, no protocol Π
can estimate p and guarantee accuracy better than Θ( 1
ε
√
n
+ mεn). As an immediate consequence,
when the data x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1} may be arbitrary, no protocol Π can estimate the mean 1n
∑
i xi
with higher accuracy.
Manipulation Attacks for Large Domains. Since estimating the mean of bits is a special case
of most problem studied in the local model, this attack already shows that manipulation can cause
additional error of Ω(mεn) for many problems. In some cases, this bound is already near-optimal,
and some protocol achieves a similar upper bound. However, for many cases of interest (such as the
frequency estimation example), protocols become more vulnerable to manipulation when the size of
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the input domain increases. Our second result is an attack on any protocol accepting inputs from
the domain [d] = {1, . . . , d} for large d, showing that manipulation can skew the distribution by
Ω˜(m
√
d
εn ) without being detected.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For every ε-differentially private local protocol Π for n users with input
domain [d], there is an attack M corrupting m users such that Π cannot distinguish between the
following cases:
1. The data is drawn from the uniform distribution U over [d] and M manipulates Π.
2. The data is drawn from some distribution P over [d] with ‖U−P‖1 = Θ
(
1
ε
√
d
logn
(
1√
n
+ mn
))
and Π has not been manipulated.
For a large class of natural protocols, the bound on ‖U−P‖1 can be sharpened to Θ(
√
d
ε (
1√
n
+ mn )).
A consequence of this attack for the example of frequency estimation above is that any local
protocol can have the distribution skewed by Ω˜(m
√
d
εn ). As we show in Section 5, this bound is
actually matched by a simple protocol.
Applications. We consider a variety of tasks of interest in local differential privacy, and show that
for each of them, one of the two attacks above gives an optimal bound on how vulnerable protocols
for that task are to manipulation. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Most tasks we consider can be formulated as instances of the following `p/`q-mean estimation
problem for vectors in Rd.1 Each user’s data xi is a vector in Rd such that the `p-norm of each data
point is bounded, ‖xi‖p ≤ 1. The protocol’s goal is to output an estimate of the mean µˆ with low
error in the `q-norm, ‖µˆ− 1n
∑n
i=1 xi‖q. This setup captures a number of widely studied problems:
• The frequency estimation example above is a special case of `1/`1 estimation, where each user
represents their word xi ∈ [d] by the standard basis vector exi ∈ Rd with a 1 in the xi-th
coordinate and 0 elsewhere.
• Computing a histogram of data in [d] is a special case of `1/`∞-mean estimation. The heavy-
hitters (HH) problem, which asks one only to identify the heaviest bins of a histogram and
their frequencies, suffices to solve `1/`∞-mean estimation, so manipulation attacks on the
latter thus imply attacks on the former. Computing heavy-hitters has been a focal point in
the past few years [HKR12, BS15, BNST17, BNS18], and it is central to systems deployed by
Google and Apple [EPK14, App17].
• Computing the answers to d statistical queries [Kea93, BDMN05, KLN+08] is a special case
of `∞/`∞-mean estimation. Users have data in some arbitrary domain X , there are d query
functions f1, . . . , fd : X → [−1, 1], and we would like an accurate estimate of
∑n
i=1 fj(xi) for
every j. In the corresponding mean estimation instance, xi = (f1(xi), . . . , fd(xi)).
• When minimizing a sum of convex functions f(θ) = ∑ni=1 fxi(θ) defined by the users’ data
(e.g. to train a machine learning model), one often computes the average gradient
∑n
i=1∇fxi(θt)
at a sequence of points θt. Typically one assumes that the gradients are bounded in `2, and
convergence requires an accurate estimate in `2, making this an instance of `2/`2-mean
estimation. (More generally, optimization requires this sort of estimation [BST14]).
1Given any vector v ∈ Rd and any p ≥ 1, the `p-norm is defined as ‖x‖p = (∑dj=1 |xj |p)1/p. For p =∞, the `∞
norm is defined as maxj=1,...,d |xj |.
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Problem No Manip. Manip. UB Manip. LB Breakdown Point
`1/`1 Estimation Θ(
√
d2
ε2n
) O˜(mn ·
√
d
ε ) Ω(
m
n ·
√
d
ε
√
logn
) [
O
(
ε
√
logn
d
)
[
(Frequency Estimation) [DJW13a] Thm 5.7 Thm 4.9
`1/`1 Testing Θ(
√
d
ε2n
) O(mn ·
√
d
ε ) Ω(
m
n ·
√
d
ε
√
logn
) [
O
(
ε
√
logn
d
)
[
(Uniformity Testing) [ACFT19] Thm 5.9 Thm 4.8
`1/`∞ Estimation Θ(
√
log d
ε2n
) O(mn · log dε ) Ω(mn · 1ε ) O(ε)
(Histograms / HH) [BS15] Thm 5.10 Thm 3.7
`∞/`∞ Estimation Θ(
√
d log d
ε2n
) O(mn · 1ε ) ] Ω(mn · 1ε ) O(ε)
(d Statistical Queries) [Folklore] Thm 5.2 Thm 3.7
`2/`2 Estimation Θ(
√
d
ε2n
) O˜(mn · 1 ) Ω(mn · 1ε ) O(ε)
(Gradients) [DJW13b] Thm 5.8 Thm 3.7
Table 1: Summary of Results. In each case, [No Manipulation] is the optimal error achievable
under local differential privacy without manipulation. For each problem, we identify some protocol
that has optimal error without manipulation such that manipulation can increase the error by
[Manipulation UB] and show that manipulation can make the error of any local protocol as large
as [Manipulation LB]. Finally, in each case, no protocol can guarantee non-trivial accuracy in
the presence of [Breakdown Point] corrupted users. ] indicates that the upper bound limited to
public-string-oblivious attacks. [ indicates that the
√
log n factor can be removed for a natural class
of protocols. In all cases, lying about m inputs (“input manipulation”) influences the correct output
by mn ; we present the upper and lower bounds as multiples of that baseline.
• We consider one further problem, `1/`1-uniformity testing, for which Acharya et al. [ACFT19]
considered LDP protocols. Assuming the data is drawn from some distribution over [d], we
want to determine if this distribution is either uniform or is far from uniform in `1 distance.
Since every `p/`q mean estimation problem generalizes binary mean estimation (the special case
where d = 1), our first attack gives a lower bound on all of these problems. Our second attack is
precisely an attack on the `1/`1-testing problem, and thus implies a lower bound of Ω˜(
m
√
d
εn ) for that
problem. Finally, since `1/`1-mean estimation problem strictly generalizes `1/`1-testing problem—
once we estimate the mean, we can determine if it is close to uniform or far from uniform—we
obtain the same lower bound for that problem.
Resilient Protocols For all of these problems we also identify and analyze protocols whose error
nearly matches the lower bounds established by our attacks. These protocols generally use the
public-coin model to compress each player’s report to a single bit, thus reducing their influence.
While all of our optimal protocols were known prior to our work, we demonstrate that the choice
of protocol is crucial. Some well known protocols with optimal accuracy absent manipulation allow
for much greater manipulation than necessary. For example, the simplest adaptation of randomized
response to frequency estimation, in which each player sends one bit per potential item, allows m
corrupted users to introduce error about md/n in a direction of their choice, which is about
√
d
larger than optimal.
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1.3 Related Work
Prior work had already observed that the specific randomized response protocol was vulnerable
to manipulation [AJL04, MN06]. In contrast to ours, these works constructed efficient cryptographic
protocols for sampling from the correct distribution, which resist our attacks. Our work shows that
some degree of cryptography is necessary to avoid manipulation.
Our work is loosely related to data poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning. In data
poisoning, the adversary is inserts additional data to somehow degrade the quality of the output.
Our attacks can be viewed as data poisoning attacks where the “data” being poisoned is actually the
messages to the protocol. Thus, our results can be viewed as showing that adding local randomization
to achieve privacy makes the protocol much more vulnerable to data poisoning.
Our work is also related to the literature on robust statistics. In the standard model of robust
statistics, we are given data drawn from distribution P with some structure (e.g. P is a Gaussian
distribution), but some small fraction of the data has been corrupted with arbitrary data, and
the goal to identify the distribution P as well as possible. Our setting is similar except that we
don’t get access to the data directly, but only once its been filtered through some set of private
local randomizers. One might hope to obtain local protocols that are robust to manipulation using
techniques from robust statistical estimators on the distribution of messages induced by the local
randomizers. Our attacks can be viewed as showing that such robust estimators don’t exist.
1.4 Organization
In Section 2 we introduce the model and key concepts. In Section 3, we demonstrate attacks
on protocols for binary data, and in Section 4, we demonstrate attacks on protocols for large data
domains. In Section 5 we identify protocols with near-optimal resistance to manipulation for a
variety of canonical problems in local differential privacy. In Section 6 we highlight the fact that not
all protocols with optimal error absent manipulation are optimally robust to manipulation.
2 Threat Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Local Differential Privacy
In this model there are n users, and each user i ∈ [n] holds some sensitive data xi ∈ X belonging
to some data universe X . There is also a public random string S. Finally there is a single aggregator
who would like to compute some function of the users’ data x1, . . . , xn. In this work, for simplicity, we
restrict attention to non-interactive local differential privacy, meaning the users and the aggregator
engage in the following type of protocol:
1. A public random string S is chosen from some distribution S over support S.
2. Each user computes a message yi ← Ri(xi, b) using a local randomizer Ri : X × S → Y.
3. The aggregator A : Yn × S → Z computes some output z ← A(y1, . . . , yn, S).
Thus the protocol Π consists of the tuple Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A,S). We will sometimes write ~R
to denote the local randomizers (R1, . . . , Rn). If R1 = · · · = Rn = R then we say the protocol is
symmetric and denote it Π = (R,A,S).
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Given user data ~x ∈ X n we will write Π(~x) to denote the distribution of the protocol’s output
when the users’ data is ~x, and ~R(~x) denotes the distribution of the protocol’s messages. Given a
distribution P over X , we will write Π(P) and ~R(P) to denote the resulting distributions when ~x
consists of n independent samples from P.
Informally, we say that the protocol satisfies local differential privacy [EGS03, DMNS06,
KLN+08] if the local randomizers depend only very weakly on their inputs. Formally,
Definition 2.1 (Local DP [EGS03, DMNS06, KLN+08]). A protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A,S)
satisfies (ε, δ)-local differential privacy if for every i ∈ [n], every x, x′ ∈ X , every S ∈ S and every
Y ⊆ Y,
P
Ri
[Ri(x, S) ∈ Y ] ≤ eε · P
Ri
[
Ri(x
′, S) ∈ Y ]+ δ (1)
where we stress that the randomness is only over the coins of Ri and not over the randomness of S.
If δ = 0, then we will simply write ε-local differential privacy.
2.2 Threat Model: Manipulation Attacks
We capture manipulation attacks via a game involving a protocol Π = (~R,A,S), a vector ~x of n
data values, and an adversary M . We parameterize the game by the number of users n and the
number of corrupted users m ≤ n, written as Manipm,n; when clear from context, the subscript is
omitted. The crux of the game is that the adversary corrupts a set C of at most m users, then the
users are assigned data ~x, and then either play honestly by sending the message yi = Ri(xi, b) or
they manipulate by playing some arbitrary message chosen by the adversary. Figure 2 presents the
structure of an attack in the case where C = {1, 2}.
The game is described in Figure 4, including a possible restriction on the attacker. We use
Manipm,n(Π, ~x,M) to denote the distribution on outputs of the protocol on data ~x and messages
manipulated by M , and Manipm,n(~R, ~x,M) to denote the distribution of messages in the protocol.
Given a distribution P over X , we will use Manipm,n(Π,P,M) and Manipm,n(~R,P,M) to denote
the resulting distributions when ~x consists of n independent samples from P.
2.3 Notational Conventions
Throughout, boldface roman letters indicate distributions (e.g. P). Vectors are denoted ~v =
(v1, v2, . . . ). We write [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Rad(µ) will denote the distribution over
{±1} with mean µ (e.g. Rad(0) is the standard Rademacher distribution).
3 Attacks Against Protocols for Binary Data
In this section, we show how to attack any protocol that estimates the mean of a Rademacher
distribution Rad(µ). 2 In particular, we show that any such protocol has error Ω(m/εn+ 1/ε
√
n)
in the presence of m corrupt users. The proof has two main steps. In the first, we argue that
every ε differentially private protocol Π for binary data is equivalent with respect to manipulation
to a protocol Π∗ where each user applies randomized response, building on [KOV15]. That is,
2The choice of data universe X = {±1} simplifies the analysis but is not inherent to the results; any binary data
universe has counterpart attacks.
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Parameters: 0 ≤ m ≤ n.
Elements: A protocol Π = (~R,A,S) for n users, a vector of data ~x, an attacker M .
1. Each user i is given data xi.
2. The public string S ∼ S is sampled.
3. The attacker M chooses a set of corrupted users C ⊆ [n] of size m.
If the corruptions are independent of the public string S then they are public-string-
oblivious, and otherwise they are public-string-adaptive.
4. The attacker M chooses a set of messages {yi}i∈S for the corrupted users.
5. The non-corrupted users i 6∈ C choose messages yi ∼ Ri(xi, b) honestly.
6. The aggregator returns z ← A(y1, . . . , yn, b).
Figure 4: Manipulation Game Manipm,n
an attack against Π∗ implies an attack against Π. In the second step, we construct an attack
against any randomized response protocol and show that it makes two distributions with distance
≈ m/εn+ 1/ε√n indistinguishable to the protocol.
3.1 Reduction to Randomized Response
This subsection will show that it is without loss of generality to design attacks for the family of
ε-randomized response protocols, in which each user’s randomizer is RRRε (see (2) below) but the
aggregator is arbitrary.
RRRε (x) :=
{
x with probability e
ε
eε+1
−x with probability 1eε+1
(2)
[KOV15] established that RRRε dominates any other ε-private local randomizer for binary data;
below, we present the result in a syntax more similar to that of [MV18].
Lemma 3.1 ([KOV15]). For any ε-private randomizer R : {
pm1} → Y, there exists a randomized algorithm R∗ such that, for any x ∈ {±1}, R∗(RRRε (x)) and
R(x) are identically distributed.
For a vector of randomizers ~R = (Ri)i∈[n], we define the vector ~R∗ := (R∗i )i∈[n]. Fix any ε-locally
private protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) with data universe {±1} and message universe Y. We
will use Π∗ to denote the symmetric protocol that uses randomizer RRRε and aggregator A∗~R,A (see
Algorithm 1). Lemma 3.1 directly implies that the transformation preserves any guarantees about
the output (e.g. estimates of a Rademacher parameter will have the same error) in the absence of
an attack:
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Algorithm 1: A∗~R,A : {±1}
n → Z
Parameters: Vector of randomizers ~R = (R1, . . . , Rn); aggregator A : Yn → Z
Input: ~y ∈ {±1}n
Output: z ∈ Z
For each i ∈ [n], construct R∗i : {±1} → Y from Ri as guaranteed by Lemma 3.1
Sample z ∼ A(R∗1(y1), . . . , R∗n(yn))
Return z
Corollary 3.2. For any ε-locally private protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for binary data and any
mean µ ∈ [−1,+1], Π(Rad(µ)) and Π∗(Rad(µ)) are identically distributed.
Now we claim that we can adapt an attack against Π∗ into one against Π, again preserving any
guarantees about the output.
Theorem 3.3. Fix any ε-locally private protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for binary data and any m ≤
n. For any manipulation attack M∗ against Π∗, there exists an attack M against Π with the following
property: for any mean µ ∈ [−1,+1], Manipm,n(Π,Rad(µ),M) and Manipm,n(Π∗,Rad(µ),M∗)
are identically distributed.
Proof. Define M to be the attack that first executes M∗ to obtain a set of corrupt users C and their
messages (y∗i )i∈C which lies in {±1}m. Then it generates (yi)i∈C , which lies in Ym, by executing
R∗i (y
∗
i ) for every i ∈ C.
To ease the presentation of the proof, we assume without loss of generality that users are
sorted so that the corrupted users C consist of the first m users. We use Y∗[m] to denote the
distribution of (y∗i )i∈[m] and R
∗
[m](Y
∗
[m]) to denote the distribution of (yi)i∈[m]. Below, each step
equates distributions:
Manip(Π,Rad(µ),M) = A
(
R∗[m](Y
∗
[m])×Rm+1(Rad(µ))× · · · ×Rn(Rad(µ))
)
= A
(
R∗[m](Y
∗
[m])×R∗m+1(RRRε (Rad(µ)))× · · · ×R∗n(RRRε (Rad(µ)))
)
= (A ◦ ~R∗)
(
Y∗[m] ×RRRε (Rad(µ))× · · · ×RRRε (Rad(µ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−m copies
)
= Manip(Π∗,Rad(µ),M∗)
The second equality comes from Lemma 3.1. This concludes the proof.
3.2 The Attack on Randomized Response
In this section, we describe an attack against ε-randomzied response protocols. By Theorem 3.3,
the statements we prove will generalize to arbitrary protocols. In particular, no protocol will be
able to distinguish between (1) the scenario where there is no attack and data comes from Rad(µ)
for a particular choice of mean p ≈ mεn + 1ε√n , and (2) the scenario where our attack is present and
data comes from Rad(0). This will imply no protocol can estimate up to error p/2 in the presence
of m corrupt users.
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Choose C, the users to corrupt, by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [n] with size m
Command each corrupted user i ∈ S to report yi ← +1.
Figure 5: A manipulation attack MRRm,n against randomized response
The attack MRRm,n is sketched in Figure 5. To aid in the analysis, we define the functions
µ(m,n) := mn +
√
2 ln 6
n and µ(m,n, ε) :=
eε+1
eε−1 · µ(m,n) = e
ε+1
eε−1
(
m
n +
√
2 ln 6
n
)
.
We will first show thatMRRm,n will make the messages generated by
~RRR(Rad(0)) indistinguishable3
from the messages generated by ~RRR(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) (Lemma 3.4). Because the same aggregator
will be run on both sets of messages, we show that the protocol’s output is likewise indistinguishable
(Corollary 3.6).
Lemma 3.4. For any n ≥ 931 and any m ≤ n/8, the distribution ~RRRε (Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) cannot be
distinguished from Manip
(
~RRRε ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
with arbitrarily low probability of failure. Specifically,
for all Y ⊆ {±1}n,
P
[
~RRRε (Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) ∈ Y
]
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(
~RRRε ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
∈ Y
]
+
1
3
(3)
Proof. We begin with the following observation: if we run RRRε on a sample from Rad(q), then the
output is drawn from Rad
(
eε−1
eε+1 · q
)
.
If we choose q = µ(m,n, ε), the output of RRRε on Rad(q) is drawn from Rad(µ(m,n)). Now
consider the distribution ~RRRε (Rad(µ(m,n, ε))). Because it is a symmetric distribution over {±1}n—
any permutation that the output takes is equally likely as any other permutation—it suffices
to consider the number of bits with value +1. Let W+ denote that number and observe that
W+ ∼ Bin(n, 12 + 12µ(m,n)), where Bin(n, p) denotes the binomial distribution over [0, n] with
expected value np.
If we choose q = 0, a message produced by RRRε (Rad(q)) is drawn from Rad(0). Now consider
the distribution Manip
(
~RRRε ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
. Due to the random choice of corrupted users, this is
a symmetric distribution over {±1}n so it suffices to consider W , the number of bits with value +1.
There are n−m bits drawn from Rad(0) in addition to m bits that deterministically have value
+1, so W ∼ Bin(n−m, 12) +m.
In Appendix A, we prove the technical claim below:
Claim 3.5. For all n ≥ 931 and m ≤ n/8, if we sample W ∼ m + Bin(n − m, 12) and W+ ∼
Bin
(
n, 12 +
m
2n +
√
ln 6
2n
)
, then for any W ⊆ [0, n],
P
[
W+ ∈ W] ≤ 51 · P[W ∈ W] + 1
3
This concludes the proof.
3We remark our notion of indistinguishability is not an explicit bound on statistical distance, but instead a one-sided
version of the differential privacy guarantee.
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Corollary 3.6. For any n ≥ 931, any protocol Π = (RRε, n,A), and any m ≤ n/8, the distribution
Π(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) cannot be distinguished from Manip
(
Π,Rad(0),MRRm,n
)
with arbitrarily low
probability of failure. Specifically, if Z is the range of A, then for all Z ⊆ Z,
P[Π(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) ∈ Z] ≤ 51 · P[Manip(Π,Rad(0),MRRm,n) ∈ Z]+ 13
Proof. We first consider the case where A is deterministic. For each Z there must be some Y ⊆ {±1}n
such that A(y) ∈ Z if and only if y ∈ Y . Hence, (3) implies our claim.
In the case where A is randomized, we invoke the property that A can be viewed as first sampling
a deterministic Aˆ, then returning Aˆ(~y). The distribution from which Aˆ is drawn is independent of
~y.
Now we show that Corollary 3.6 implies a lower bound for Rademacher estimation.
Theorem 3.7. For any n ≥ 931, any ε-locally private Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) that performs
Rademacher estimation, and any m ≤ n/8, either
P
[∣∣Π(Rad(µ(m,n, ε)))− µ(m,n, ε)∣∣ ≥ eε + 1
eε − 1
(
m
2n
+
√
ln 6
2n
)]
≥ 1
78
(4)
or there is an attack MΠm,n such that
P
[∣∣Manip(Π,Rad(0),MΠm,n)∣∣ ≥ eε + 1eε − 1
(
m
2n
+
√
ln 6
2n
)]
≥ 1
78
(5)
That is, either the protocol is inaccurate absent a manipulation attack or inaccurate under some
manipulation attack.
Proof. By Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3, it is without loss of generality to assume Π is an ε-
randomized response protocol. To reduce space, we will use shorthand α← eε+1eε−1
(
m
2n +
√
ln 6
2n
)
and
p← µ(m,n, ε).
We take the attack to be MRRm,n. If (5) is true, then the proof is complete. Otherwise, we will
prove (4) under the premise that P
[∣∣Manip(Π,Rad(0),MRRm,n)∣∣ ≥ α] < 1/78. Observe that p = 2α.
P[|Π(Rad(µ))− p| < α] ≤ P[|Π(Rad(µ))| ≥ α]
≤ 51 · P[∣∣Manip(Π,Rad(0),MRRm,n)∣∣ ≥ α]+ 13 (Coro. 3.6)
<
77
78
(4) immediately follows from this upper bound. This concludes the proof.
3.3 Generalizing to Approximate Differential Privacy
For clarity of exposition, we have limited the analysis to protocols that satisfy pure differential
privacy. Here, we generalize our attack to approximate differential privacy.
RRRε,δ(x) :=

x with probability (1− δ) · eεeε+1
−x with probability (1− δ) · 1eε+1
2x with probability δ
(6)
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The randomized algorithm RRRε,δ “fails at privacy” with probability δ: it reports an integer whose
sign is the input x. Otherwise, it simply runs RRRε .
Lemma 3.8 (From [KOV15]). For any (ε, δ)-private randomizer R : {±1} → Y, there exists a
randomized algorithm R∗ such that, for any x ∈ {±1}, R∗(RRε,δ(x)) and R(x).
From this lemma, we may construct (ε, δ) variants of A∗~R,A (Algorithm 1) and Π
∗. Hence, we
obtain these generalizations of Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.3:
Corollary 3.9. For any (ε, δ)-locally private protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for binary data and
any mean µ ∈ [−1,+1], Π(Rad(µ)) and Π∗(Rad(µ)) are identically distributed.
Theorem 3.10. Fix any (ε, δ)-locally private protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for binary data and any
m ≤ n. For any manipulation attack M∗ against Π∗, there exists an attack M against Π with the fol-
lowing property: for any mean µ ∈ [−1,+1], Manipm,n(Π,Rad(µ),M) and Manipm,n(Π∗,Rad(µ),M∗)
are identically distributed.
We finally argue that MRRm,n is effective against any (ε, δ) private randomized response protocol:
Lemma 3.11. For any n ≥ 931 and m ≤ n/8, the distribution −−→RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) cannot be
distinguished from Manip
(−−→
RRRε,δ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
with arbitrarily low probability of failure. Specifically,
for all Y ⊆ {−2,−1,+1,+2}n,
P
[−−→
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))) ∈ Y
]
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(−−→
RRRε,δ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
∈ Y
]
+
1
3
+ nδ
Proof. For our proof, we use F to denote the set of strings F that contain at least one failure
integer: F := {F ∈ {−2,−1,+1,+2}n | F ∩ {−2,+2} 6= ∅}.
P
[−−→
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))
n) ∈ Y
]
= P
[−−→
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))
n) ∈ Y −F
]
+ P
[−−→
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))
n) ∈ Y ∩ F
]
≤ P
[−−→
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ(m,n, ε))
n) ∈ Y −F
]
+ nδ (Union bound)
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(−−→
RRRε,δ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
∈ Y −F
]
+
1
3
+ nδ
(From Lemma 3.4)
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(−−→
RRRε,δ,Rad(0),M
RR
m,n
)
∈ Y
]
+
1
3
+ nδ
This concludes the proof.
4 Attacks Against Protocols for Large Data Universes
In this section, we show that more powerful manipulation attacks are possible when the data
universe is [d] for d > 2. For binary data, our attack showed that for any protocol there are
two distributions U and P (i.e. Rad(0) and Rad(µ(m,n, ε)) with large statistical distance but
are indistinguishable under manipulation. Specifically, ‖U−P‖1 = Ω( 1ε√n + mεn) where ‖U−P‖1
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denotes `1 distance between the distributions
∑d
j=1 |U(j) − P(j)|. In this section, we show that
there is an attack and a distribution such that ‖U−P‖1 = Ω
(√
d
logn(
1
ε
√
n
+ mεn)
)
and U,P are
indistinguishable under this attack. This construction implies lower bounds for uniformity testing
(given samples from P, determine if P = U or if ‖P−U‖1 is large) and `1 estimation (given samples
from P, report P′ such that ‖P−P′‖1 is small).
Intuitively, our proof has the following structure. We show that, for every ε differentially private
local randomizer R : [d] → Y, there is a set H ⊂ [d] such that R(U) and R(UH) are within an
≈ ε/√d multiplicative factor of one another. The size of H will be d/2 so ‖U−UH‖1 = 1/2. If a
protocol Π could distinguish between U and UH then we would be able to create a protocol Π
′
for binary data that distinguishes Rad(0) from Rad(1). Specifically, if xi = 1 then replace it with
x′i ∼ UH and otherwise x′i ∼ UH then run Π on x′1, . . . , x′n. Since Π′ is ε/
√
d private, there must
be a manipulation attack that defeats it when m ≈ nε/√d. Our proof formalizes this intuition and
generalizes it to the full range of m.
4.1 A Family of Data Distributions
In this section, we show a particular way to convert a Rademacher distribution into a distribution
over [d]. For a given partition of [d] into H,H where |H| = d/2, we map the value +1 to a
uniform element of H and −1 to a uniform element of H. Thus, when x ∼ Rad(µ), we obtain a
corresponding random variable xˆ over [d] whose distribution is PH,µ (see (7) below). Notice that
estimating P[xˆ ∈ H] implies estimating µ.
PH,µ :=
{
Uniform over H with probability 12 +
µ
2
Uniform over H otherwise
(7)
The algorithm QH,R (Algorithm 2) performs the encoding of binary data x ∈ {±1} into xˆ ∈ [d]
then executes the randomizer R. Claim 4.1 is immediate from the construction.
Algorithm 2: QH,R a local randomizer for binary data
Parameters: A subset H ⊂ [d] with size d/2; a local randomizer R : [d]→ Y
Input: x ∈ {±1}
Output: y ∈ Y
If x = 1 then sample xˆ uniformly from H; otherwise, sample xˆ uniformly from H.
Return y ∼ R(xˆ)
Claim 4.1. For any local randomizer R : [d] → Y, H ⊂ [d] with size d/2, and p ∈ [−1,+1], the
execution of QH,R (Algorithm 2) on a value drawn from Rad(µ) is equivalent with the execution of
R on a value drawn from PH,µ:
QH,R(Rad(µ)) = R(PH,µ)
So for every choice of H, µ, and Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A), we can express each message from honest
user i as the output of a randomizer QH,Ri that takes binary input. When these randomizers obey
approximate differential privacy, Lemma 3.8 tells us that each randomizer can be decomposed into
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Choose H by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [d] with size d/2
Choose C, the users to corrupt, by uniformly sampling from all subsets of [n] with size m
Command each corrupted user i ∈ S to report yi ∼ Q∗H,Ri(+1)
Figure 6: MΠm,n, an attack against protocol Π = (
~R,A) for n users and data universe [d]
two algorithms, the first being RRRε,δ (see (6)). The second is a randomizer-dependent algorithm
Q∗H,Ri . For brevity, we will use
~Q∗H to denote the vector of all n of them.
Lemma 4.2. Fix any protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) with data universe [d], and any H ⊂ [d] with
size d/2. If each QH,Ri satisfies (ε, δ) privacy, then for any value p ∈ [−1,+1],
~R(PH,µ) = ~Q
∗
H
(
~RRRε,δ(Rad(µ))
)
4.2 The Attack
In this subsection, we describe how m corrupted users can attack an arbitrary ε-private protocol
Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A). This attack, denoted M
Π
m,n, is sketched in Figure 6. The first step is to
sample a uniformly random H. We show that if this H has the property that all QH,R1 , . . . , QH,Rn
all satisfy (ε′, δ) differential privacy, then this attack inherits guarantees from the attack MRRm,n
against RRε′,δ. Then we show that this property holds with constant probability.
We begin the analysis of MΠm,n by considering its behavior conditioned on a fixed choice of H.
This restricted form will be denoted MΠ,Hm,n . Then we will show that the random choice of H gives
the desired lower bound.
4.2.1 Analysis for fixed set H
Here, we show that manipulating Π with MΠ,Hm,n induces the same distribution as if we had
manipulated randomized response RRε with M
RR
m,n:
Claim 4.3. Fix any protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for data universe [d], any m ≤ n, and any
H ⊂ [d] with size d/2. If each QH,Ri satisfies (ε, δ) privacy, then for any value p ∈ [−1,+1], the
distribution Manip
(
~R,PH,µ,M
Π,H
m,n
)
is identical to ~Q∗H
(
Manip
(
~RRRε,δ,Rad(µ),M
RR
m,n
))
Proof. The choice of C in MRRm,n has the same distribution as in M
Π,H
m,n . To simplify the presentation,
we assume that the users are sorted so that the corrupted set C = [m].
Manip
(
~R,PH,µ,M
Π,H
m,n
)
= (Q∗H,Ri(1))i≤m × (Ri(PH,µ))i>m (By construction)
= (Q∗H,Ri(1))i≤m × (QH,Ri(Rad(µ)))i>m (Claim 4.1)
= (Q∗H,Ri(1))i≤m ×
(
Q∗H,Ri
(
RRRε,δ(Rad(µ))
))
i>m
(Lemma 3.8)
= ~Q∗H
(
Manip
(
~RRRε,δ,Rad(µ),M
RR
m,n
))
This concludes the proof.
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Lemma 4.2 and Claim 4.3 imply that we can use the analysis of MRRm,n for our new attack M
Π,H
m,n
provided that (ε, δ) privacy holds for all QH,Ri :
Lemma 4.4. Fix any protocol Π = ((R1, . . . , Rn), A) for data universe [d], any m ≤ n, and any
H ⊂ [d] with size d/2. There exists a value µ ∈ [−1,+1] such that
‖U−PH,µ‖1 =
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(
m
n
+
√
2 ln 6
n
)
(8)
but if each QH,Ri is (ε, δ) differentially private, then for any Y ⊂ Yn,
P
[
~R(PH,µ) ∈ Y
]
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(
~R,U,MΠ,Hm,n
)
∈ Y
]
+
1
3
+ nδ (9)
Proof. Recall the function µ(m,n, ε) = e
ε+1
eε−1
(
m
n +
√
2 ln 6
n
)
. We will set µ← µ(m,n, ε). By Lemma
3.11, we have
P
[
~Q∗H
(
~RRRε,δ(Rad(µ))
)
∈ Y
]
≤ 51 · P
[
~Q∗H
(
Manip
(
~RRRε,δ,Rad(0);M
RR
m,n
))
∈ Y
]
+
1
3
+ nδ
and by Lemma 4.2 and Claim 4.3 that statement implies (9).
It remains to prove (8). When sampling x ∼ PH,µ, the probability that x = h is 1+µd for each
h ∈ H and 1−µd for each h /∈ H. Hence,
‖U−PH,µ‖1 =
d
2
·
∣∣∣∣1d − 1 + µd
∣∣∣∣+ d2 ·
∣∣∣∣1d − 1− µd
∣∣∣∣
= µ
=
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(
m
n
+
√
2 ln 6
n
)
This concludes the proof.
4.2.2 Analysis for randomized H
Here, we obtain a lower bound by analyzing randomness in H. We begin with a lemma that
bounds the privacy parameters of all QH,Ri by an ε
′ that depends on the structure of ~R: we will
use |~R| 6= to denote the number of unique randomizers in ~R.
Lemma 4.5. Fix any ~R where each Ri : [d]→ Y is ε differentially private. There is a constant c
such that, if d > c · (e2ε − 1)2 ln
(
|Y| · |~R|6=
)
and H is drawn uniformly from all subsets of [d] with
size d/2, then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: Every QH,Ri
specified by Algorithm 2 is ε′ differentially private, where
ε′ = (e2ε − 1)
√
c
d
ln
(
|Y| · |~R|6=
)
We continue with a bound that only depends on n and not any particular structure in ~R:
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Lemma 4.6. Fix any ~R where each Ri : [d]→ Y is ε differentially private. There is a constant c
such that, if d > c · (e2ε − 1)2 ln(eεn) and H is drawn uniformly from all subsets of [d] with size d/2,
then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: Every QH,Ri specified by
Algorithm 2 is (ε′, 1/180n) differentially private, where
ε′ = (e2ε − 1)
√
c
d
ln(eεn)
Proofs of these statements can be found in Appendix B. From Lemmas 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6, we
have an attack that, with probability 2/3, successfully obscures a uniform distribution:
Lemma 4.7. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, any ε < 1, and any ε-locally private protocol
Π = (~R,A) that accepts data from [d]. There are constants c0, c1 and a value p ∈ [−1,+1] such that,
for all H ⊂ [d] with size |H| = d/2,
‖U−PH,µ‖1 ≥
c1 ·
√
d
ε
√
ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
) ·
(
m
n
+
√
1
n
)
but if d > c0 · (e2ε − 1)2 ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
)
, then the following holds with probability > 2/3 over
the random choice of H in MΠm,n (Figure 6)
P
[
~R(PH,µ) ∈ Y
]
≤ 51 · P
[
Manip
(
~R,U,MΠ,Hm,n
)
∈ Y
]
+
61
180
4.3 Applications to Testing and Estimation
From Lemma 4.7, we immediately derive a lower bound on how well the manipulation attack
fares against uniformity testers:
Theorem 4.8. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, any ε < 1, and any ε-locally private protocol
Π = (~R,A) for testing uniformity over [d]. There are constants c0, c1 such that for all d >
c0 · (e2ε − 1)2 ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
)
and all distributions P that satisfy
‖U−P‖1 ≥
c1 ·
√
d
ε
√
ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R| 6=
) ·
(
m
n
+
√
1
n
)
(10)
at least one of the following holds:
P[Π(P) = “uniform”] ≥ 1
80
P
[
Manip
(
Π,U,MΠm,n
)
= “not uniform”
] ≥ 1
120
Directly applying Lemma 4.7 to distribution estimation would give an Ω
(√
d
logn
(
m
εn +
1
ε
√
n
))
lower bound on error in `1 distance. But a theorem in [YB18] implies that estimation protocols
must have error Ω
(
d
ε
√
n
)
in `1 distance. We integrate these two results below:
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Theorem 4.9. Fix any n ≥ 931, any m ≤ n/8, and any ε ∈ [−1,+1]. There exists constants
c0, c1 such that, for any ε-locally private protocol Π = (~R,A) that estimates distributions over [d]
where d > c0 · (e2ε − 1)2 ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
)
, there exists a distribution P where at least one of the
following holds:
P
‖Π(P)−P‖1 ≥ c1ε
 d√
n
+
m
n
·
√√√√ d
ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
)

 > 1
80
P
∥∥Manip(Π,U,MΠm,n)−U∥∥1 ≥ c1ε
 d√
n
+
m
n
·
√√√√ d
ln
(
minn, |Y| · |~R|6=
)

 > 1
120
5 Protocols with Nearly Optimal Robustness to Manipulation
In this section, we consider a number of well-studied problems in local privacy and identify
specific protocols from the literature that have optimal robustness to manipulation (i.e. matching
the lower bounds implied by our attacks). As discussed in the introduction, most of these problems
can be cast as accurately estimating the mean of bounded vectors.
5.1 Warmup: Mean Estimation for Binary Data
As a warmup, we analyze the randomized response protocol in the presence of manipulation.
Recall that the protocol is defined by the local randomized RRRε and aggregator A
RR
n,ε as follows
(where we have rescaled the messages to be an unbiased estimate of x, which is more convenient for
analysis):
RRRε (x) :=
{
eε+1
eε−1 · x with probability e
ε
eε+1
− eε+1eε−1 · x with probability 1eε+1
ARRn,ε(~y) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
yi
We bound the error of this protocol by O(1ε (
1√
n
+ mn ), which matches the lower bound of Theorem
3.7 up to constants.
Theorem 5.1. For any positive integers m ≤ n, any ε > 0, any ~x ∈ {0, 1}n, any manipulation
adversary M , and any β > 0,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣Manipm,n(RRε,n, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ < eε + 1eε − 1 ·
(√
2
n
ln
2
β
+
2m
n
)]
≥ 1− β
Proof. Consider an execution of Manip(RRε,n, ~x,M). Let C be the set of users corrupted by M , let
y1, . . . , yn be the messages sent in the protocol and let ~y be the messages that would have been
sent in an honest execution (so y
i
= yi for every i 6∈ C). Let z = 1n
∑n
i=1 yi be the output of the
aggregator.
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We can break up the error into two components, one corresponding to the error of the honest
execution and one corresponding to the error introduced by manipulation.∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]
yi − 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]
yi − 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
y
i
+
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
y
i
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]
yi − 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
y
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]
y
i
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i∈C
yi − yi
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
manipulation
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
∑
i∈[n]
y
i
− 1
n
∑
i∈[n]
xi
∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
honest execution
Since each message in the protocol is either e
ε+1
eε−1 or − e
ε+1
eε−1 , we have |yi − yi| ≤ 2 · e
ε+1
eε−1 . Thus, the
manipulation term is bounded by e
ε+1
eε−1 · 2mn .
For the error of the honest execution, note that E
[
y
i
]
= xi and
1
n
∑
i∈[n] yi is an average of n
independent random variables bounded to a range of width 2 · eε+1eε−1 . Thus, by Hoeffding’s inequality,
we have that with probability at least 1− β, the second term is bounded by eε+1eε−1
√
2 ln(2/β)
n with
probability at least 1− β.
Our analysis of richer protocols has the same structure. We construct the protocol so that each
message yi gives an unbiased estimate of xi, and the aggregation computes the mean of the messages.
We then isolate the effect of the manipulation from that of an honest execution. Finally, we have to
bound the degree to which a set of m messages influences the output of the protocol. For richer
protocols the analysis of the final step will become more involved.
5.2 Mean Estimation
We consider vector-valued data in Rd. For any p ≥ 1, ‖x‖p := (
∑d
j=1 |xj |p)1/p denotes the
standard `p norm and B
d
p denotes the `p unit ball in Rd. As is standard ‖x‖∞ = maxj∈[d] |xj | is
the `∞ norm and Bd∞ is the `∞ unit ball. In this section, we study instances of the general `p/`q
mean estimation problem: given data x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bdp , output some µˆ such that
∥∥µˆ− 1n∑i xi∥∥q is
as small as possible.
5.2.1 `∞/`∞ estimation (Counting Queries)
In this problem, each user has data xi ∈ Bd∞ and the goal is to obtain a vector µˆ such that∥∥µˆ− 1n∑xi∥∥∞ is as small as possible. We consider the following protocol EST∞ = (REST∞, n,AEST∞),
which is known to have optimal error absent manipulation.
1. Using public randomness, we partition users into d groups each of size n/d. Intuitively, we are
assigning each group to one coordinate.
2. For each group j, each user i in group j reports the message yi ← RRR(xi,j)
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3. For each group j, the aggregator computes the average of the messages from group j to obtain
µˆj ≈ 1n
∑
i xi,j . The aggregator reports µˆ = (µˆ1, . . . , µˆd)
If the adversary’s corruptions are oblivious to the public partition, then we show that there
are ≈ m/d corrupt users in each group of size n/d. By our analysis of randomized response, the
adversary can introduce at most ≈ m/dεn/d = mεn error in any single coordinate.
Theorem 5.2. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd∞, and any
public-string-oblivious adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(EST∞ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
= O
(√
d log d
ε2n
+
m
εn
)
Observe that the dependence on m matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for Bernoulli
estimation. We give the full details of the protocol in Appendix C.1.
5.2.2 `1/`∞ Estimation (Histograms)
In this problem, each user i has data xi ∈ Bd1 and the objective is a µˆ such that
∥∥µˆ− 1n∑ni=1 xi∥∥∞
is as small as possible. To simplify the discussion, we focus on the special case where user i has
data xi ∈ [d]. Define freq(j, ~x) := 1n
∑n
i=1 1[xi = j] and freq(~x) := (freq(1, ~x), . . . , freq(1, ~x)). The
objective is a vector µˆ such that ‖µˆ− freq(~x)‖∞ is as small as possible.
We consider the following protocol HST,4, which is known to have optimal error absent manipu-
lation:
1. For each user i, independently sample a uniform public vector ~si ∈ {±1}d.
2. Each user i reports the message yi ← RRRε (si,xi) to the aggregator.
3. The aggregator receives messages y1, . . . , yn and outputs µˆ← 1n
∑n
i=1 yi · ~si.
Theorem 5.3. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ [d], and any
adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have∥∥Manipm,n(HSTε, ~x,M)− freq(~x)∥∥∞ = O
(√
log d
ε2n
+
m
εn
)
Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the
honest and corrupt users. Let ~y be the messages sent in the protocol and let ~y be the messages that
would have been sent in an honest execution.∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si +
1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
= max
j∈[d]
[
1
n
∑
i∈C
(yi − yi)si,j
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
manipulation
+ max
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
y
i
si,j − 1[xi = j]
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
honest execution
4In [BNST17] the protocol is called ExplicitHist.
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To bound the error from the manipulation, note that messages have magnitude e
ε+1
eε−1 = Θ(1/ε).
Hence, the bias introduced to any coordinate j is at most O(m/εn) with probability 1.
sWe now bound the error introduced by the honest execution of the protocol. If xi = j, the
expectation of y
i
si,j is 1. Otherwise, the expectation is 0 because of pairwise independence. Hence,
the honest execution has 0 expected error. Because messages have magnitude Θ(1/ε), Hoeffding’s
inequality and a union bound imply that no frequency estimate is more than O(
√
log d/ε2n) from
freq(j, ~x) with probability ≥ 99/100. This concludes the proof.
A slightly more general protocol can be used to obtain the same result for `1/`∞ estimation.
Theorem 5.4. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there is an ε-locally private protocol EST1ε such that for any
positive integer n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd1 , and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(EST1ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
= O
(√
log d
ε2n
+
m
εn
)
Observe that the manipulation error matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for
Bernoulli estimation. We give the full details of the protocol EST1ε in Appendix C.2.
5.2.3 `1/`1 Estimation (Frequency Estimation)
In this problem, each user i has data xi ∈ Bd1 and the objective is a µˆ such that
∥∥µˆ− 1n∑ni=1 xi∥∥1
is as small as possible. Because this problem and the `1/`∞ problem have the same data type, we
consider the same protocols but change the analysis to upper bound `1 error.
Theorem 5.5. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integer n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ [d], and any adversary
M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(HSTε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= O
(√
d2 log n
ε2n
+
m
√
d log n
εn
)
Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the
honest and corrupt users. Let ~y be the messages sent in the protocol and let ~y be the messages that
would have been sent in an honest execution. Let S ∈ {±1}d×n be the matrix whose columns are
~s1, . . . , ~sn, and SC ∈ {±1}d×|C| be the submatrix consisting only columns corresponding to users
i ∈ C. ∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si +
1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si
∥∥∥∥∥
1
+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − freq(~x)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i∈C
(yi − yi)si,j
∣∣∣∣∣+ ∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
y
i
si,j − 1[xi = j]
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∥∥∥∥ 1nSC(~yC − ~yC)
∥∥∥∥
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
manipulation
+
∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
y
i
si,j − 1[xi = j]
∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
honest execution
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To bound the error from the honest execution, observe that the expectation and variance are
O(
√
1/ε2n) and O(1/εn), respectively, for any term in the outer sum. Hence, error has magnitude
O(
√
d2/ε2n) with probability ≥ 199/200.
To bound the error from the manipulation, we will use bounds on the singular values of the
random matrix SC . As a shorthand, let cε =
eε+1
eε−1 . Then we have∥∥∥∥ 1nSC(~yC − ~yC)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 1
n
max
C⊆[n]
∥∥∥SC(~yC − ~yC)∥∥∥1
≤ 2
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈{−cε,cε}m
‖SC~yC‖1
=
2
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤cε
√
m
‖SC~yC‖1
≤ cε
√
md
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤1
‖SC~yC‖2
=
cε
√
md
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
‖SC‖2
where ‖SC‖2 denotes the largest singular value (operator norm) of SC . Since each matrix SC ∈
{±1}d×m is uniformly random, we can use strong bounds on the singular values of random matrices.
Lemma 5.6 (see e.g. the textbook [Tao12]). For any k ∈ R+ larger than an absolute constant and
a matrix SC ∈ Rd×m whose entries are sampled independently and identically, the following holds
with probability ≥ 1− exp(−k(d+m)) over the randomness of SC .
‖SC‖2 = O(
√
kd+
√
km)
The adversary has
(
n
m
) ≤ exp(m lnn) choices of corruptions C. By a union bound over that set,
we have with probability ≥ 1− exp(m lnn− k(m+ d))∥∥∥∥ 1nSC(~yC − ~yC)
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ cε
√
md
n
·O(
√
kd+
√
km)
= O
(√
d2k
ε2n
+
m
√
dk
εn
)
The probability is ≥ 199/200 when k = O(lnn). A union bound over the manipulation and honest
execution completes the proof.
A slightly more general protocol can be used to obtain the same result for `1/`1 estimation.
Theorem 5.7. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), there is an ε-locally private protocol EST1 such that for any
positive integer n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ (Bd1)n, and any adversary M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we
have ∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(EST1ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= O
(√
d2 log n
ε2n
+
m
√
d log n
εn
)
Observe that the manipulation error matches the lower bound in Theorem 4.9, up to a logarithmic
factor.
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5.2.4 `2/`2 Estimation
In this problem, each user i has data xi ∈ Bd2 and the objective is a µˆ such that
∥∥µˆ− 1n∑ni=1 xi∥∥2
is as small as possible.
Consider the protocol EST2,5 described below
1. For each user i, we sample ~si ∈ Rd uniformly at random from the surface of Bd2 .
2. Each user i computes wi ← sgn(~si · xi) and then reports yi ← RRRε (wi) to the aggregator
3. The aggregator receives the messages y1, . . . , yn and outputs ~z ← c
√
d
n
∑n
i=1 yi~si for some
absolute constant c.
Theorem 5.8. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integer n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd2 , and any adversary
M , with probability ≥ 99/100, we have∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(EST2ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= O
(√
d log n
ε2n
+
m
√
log n
εn
)
Proof Sketch. Identically to the proof of Theorem 5.1, we partition the error contributed by the
honest and corrupt users. Let S ∈ {±1}d×n be the matrix whose columns are ~s1, . . . , ~sn, and
SC ∈ {±1}d×|C| be the submatrix consisting only columns corresponding to users i ∈ C.∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si +
c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
yi~si − c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
∑
i∈C
(yi − yi)si,j
∥∥∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
SC(~yC − ~yC)
∥∥∥∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
manipulation
+
∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
n∑
i=1
y
i
~si − 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
honest execution
A lemma from [DJW13b] implies that the error introduced by the honest execution of the
protocol is O(
√
d/ε2n) with probability ≥ 299/300.
To bound the error from the manipulation, we will again use bounds on the singular values of
5The protocol is a variation of one described in Section 4.2.3 of [DJW13b].
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the random matrix SC . As a shorthand, let cε =
eε+1
eε−1 . Then we have∥∥∥∥∥c
√
d
n
SC(~yC − ~yC)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ c
√
d
n
max
C⊆[n]
∥∥∥SC(~yC − ~yC)∥∥∥2
≤ 2c
√
d
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈{−cε,cε}m
‖SC~yC‖2
=
2c
√
d
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤cε
√
m
‖SC~yC‖2
≤ 2ccε
√
md
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤1
‖SC~yC‖2 (11)
For any i ∈ C, consider the random variable ~si ′ ∼ N(0, Id×d). The column vector ~si is
identically distributed with ~si
′
‖~si ′‖2 . By standard concentration arguments, there is a constant c
′
such that mini‖~si ′‖22 ≥ d− c′
√
d lnm with probability ≥ 299/300. When d > 4(c′)2 lnm, we have
mini‖~si ′‖22 > d/2.6 Hence,
(11) ≤ 2ccε
√
md
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤1
max
i∈C
1
‖~si ′‖2
∥∥S′C~yC∥∥2
≤ ccε
√
8m
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
max
~yC∈Rm
‖~y‖2≤1
∥∥S′C~yC∥∥2
=
ccε
√
8m
n
max
C⊆[n]
|C|=m
∥∥S′C∥∥2
We apply Lemma 5.6 then choose k = O(lnn) to bound ‖S′C‖2 by O(
√
d lnn +
√
m lnn) with
probability ≥ 299/300. A union bound completes the proof.
Observe that the manipulation error matches that of the lower bound in Theorem 3.7 for
Bernoulli estimation up to a logarithmic factor.
5.3 Uniformity Testing
In this problem, each user has data xi ∈ [d] sampled from a distribution P. If P = U, then a
protocol for this problem should output “uniform” with probability ≥ 99/100. If ‖P−U‖1 > α,
then it should output “not uniform” with probability ≥ 99/100. Smaller values of α are desirable.
We consider the RAPTOR protocol, introduced by [ACFT19]. It divides users into G groups each
of size n/G (where G is a parameter). In each group g,
1. Sample public set S ∈ {S ⊂ [d] | |S| = d/2} uniformly at random.
2. Each user assigns x′i ← +1 if xi ∈ S and otherwise x′i ← −1
3. Each user i reports yi ← RRRε (x′i) to the aggregator
6In the case where d < 4(c′)2 lnm, we bound the error from manipulation by 2ccεm
√
d/n = O(m
√
logn/εn).
26
4. The aggregator computes the average of the messages: µˆg ← Gn
∑
yi.
If there is some µˆg '
√
1
ε2n
+ mεn , the aggregator reports “not uniform.” Otherwise, it reports
“uniform.”
Theorem 5.9. There is a choice of parameter G such that, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers
m ≤ n, and any adversary M , the following holds with probability ≥ 99/100
Manipm,n(RAPTORε,U,M) = “uniform”
and, when ‖P−U‖1 ≥ α for some α = O
(√
d
ε2n
+ m
√
d
εn
)
, the following also holds with probability
≥ 99/100
Manipm,n(RAPTORε,P,M) = “not uniform”
Proof Sketch. Consider any g ∈ [G]. When ‖P−U‖1 ≥
√
10d · α, a lemma by [ACFT19] implies
that, with at least some constant probability over the randomness of S,
∣∣∣∣ Px∼P[x ∈ S]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ' α. For
α '
√
G/ε2n+mG/εn, RRε will provide an estimate of P
x∼P
[x ∈ S] that is larger than 12 +α/2. But
when P = U, the protocol will give an estimate of P
x∼P
[x ∈ S] that is less than 12 +α/2. This means
there is a threshold test that has a constant probability of succeeding. The G repetitions serve to
increase the success probability to 99/100. This completes the proof.
Observe that the bound α = O(m
√
d
εn +
√
d
ε2n
) matches the lower bound of Theorem 4.8 up to
logarithmic factors. We give the full details of the protocol in Appendix C.3.
5.4 Heavy Hitters
In this problem, each user has data xi ∈ [d]. The objective is to find a small subset L of the
universe that contains every element j ∈ [d] such that freqj(~x) > α. Because there are 1/α heavy
hitters, the size of L should be O(1/α).
We consider the protocol HH described in [BNST17].7
1. Sample public hash function h : [d] → [k] uniformly from a universal family (k  d is a
protocol parameter). Also sample pi uniformly from partitions of [n] into groups of size
n/ log2 d. Intuitively, users in group g will communicate the g-th bit of their data value to the
aggregator
2. Each user i in each group g:
(a) obtains bit(g, xi), the g-th bit in the binary representation of xi.
(b) computes x′i ← 2 · h(xi)− bit(g, xi).
(c) reports yi ← RHST(x′i) to the aggregator.
3. The aggregator iterates through each j′ ∈ [k] and constructs Lj′ in the following manner:
7In [BNST17], the protocol is called Bitstogram.
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(a) Iterate through g ∈ log2 d. At each step (j′, g), gather the messages from group g then
use AHST to obtain an approximate histogram over 2k. If the estimated frequency of
2 · j′ − 1 is larger than that of 2 · j′, then set zj′,g ← 1 and otherwise zj′,g ← 0.
(b) Lj′ ← the number represented in binary by zj′,1, . . . , zj′,log2 d
4. The aggregator reports L← (L1, . . . , Lk) as heavy hitters
The size of L is at most k and the time spent by the aggregator to construct L is O(nk2 log d)
(from k log2 d executions of A
HST). An upper bound on error under manipulation follows from
Theorem 5.3, taking care to adjust the number of bins to 2k and the number of users to n/ log2 d.
Theorem 5.10. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), any positive integers m ≤ n, any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [d]n, and
any adversary M , if we execute L ← Manipm,n(HHε, ~x,M) with parameter k ← 300n2, then with
probability ≥ 99/100, L contains all j such that freqj(~x) > α where
α = O
(√
(log d) · log(n log d)
ε2n
+
m log d
εn
)
Proof Sketch. For any group g, let ~x(g) denote the data of users in group g. We first argue that
three undesirable events occur with low probability.
• For some g, |freq(~x) − freq(~x(g))|∞ '
√
(log d)/n. By Hoeffding’s inequality and a union
bound over all groups, this happens with probability ≤ 1/300.
• Two data values that appear in ~x collide. Due to the size of k, this happens with probability
≤ 1/300.
• For some g, the error of the private histogram is too large. Specifically, there is a value
α0 ≈
√
(log d)·log(n log d)
ε2n
+ m log dεn such that
∥∥µˆ(g) − freq(~x(g))∥∥∞ > α0. From Theorem 5.3 and
a union bound over all groups, this event happens with probability ≤ 1/300.
The remainder of the proof sketch assumes these events have not occurred.
We fix any j ∈ [d] and any g ∈ [log2 d]. We will argue that if j is a heavy hitter, then the
aggregator will reconstruct the g-th bit of j. Let pi(g) be the ordered set of users in group g and let
~x ′ denote the vector (x′i)i∈pi(g).
Suppose freq(j, ~x) = τ . Because there are no collisions between hashes, it must be the case that
freq(2h(j)− bit(g, j), ~x ′) ' τ −√(log d)/n and freq(2h(j)− 1 + bit(g, j), ~x ′) = 0. The aggregator
estimates these frequencies up to simultaneous error α0. So, when τ > α ≈
√
(log d)/n+ 2α0, the
estimate of freq(2h(j)− bit(g, j), ~x ′) exceeds that of freq(2h(j)− 1 + bit(g, j), ~x ′). This means the
aggregator will assign zh(j),g ← bit(g, j).
We remark that the above sketch and analysis are for the simplest version of HH, in which
k = O(n2). In [BNST17], the authors show that k = O(1/α) = O˜(
√
n) suffices, achieving a smaller
list and faster running time. We provide the full details of HH in Appendix C.4.
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6 Suboptimal Protocols
In this section we demonstrate that there exist protocols with optimal error absent manipulation
(m = 0) that perform quite poorly in the presence of manipulation (m > 0), thereby showing that a
careful choice of protocols was necessary to achieve optimal robustness in Section 5.
Intuitively, the protocols in Section 5 achieve optimal robustness because they use public
randomness to significantly constrain the choices of the corrupted users, and we argue that if we
allow users to generate the randomness themselves, which has no effect on the protocol absent
manipulation, then the protocol becomes much less robust.
We can sketch an example of this phenomenon for frequency estimation, although essentially
the same phenomenon arises in all of the problems we study. Consider the following variant of the
frequency estimation protocol:
1. Each user chooses a uniformly random vector ~si ∈ {±1}d.
2. Each user samples γi ← RRRε (~si,xi) and reports the message ~yi ← γi~si ∈ {± e
ε+1
eε−1}d.
3. The aggregator outputs µˆ← 1n
∑n
i=1 ~yi.
One can verify that when all users follow the protocol honestly, the distribution of the output µˆ is
identical to that of the protocol HSTε. Therefore, when users are honest, with high probability we
have ‖µˆ− freq(~x)‖1 = O(
√
d2/ε2n).
However, because the adversary can have the corrupted users report arbitrary vectors in {± eε+1eε−1}d,
and adversary who corrupts the first m users can introduce error on the order of
max
~y1,...,~ym∈{±1}d
∥∥∥∥∥ 1n
m∑
i=1
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)
~yi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
(
eε + 1
eε − 1
)
md
n
= Ω
(
md
εn
)
In contrast, when we use the protocol HSTε, we were able to show that the adversary could only
introduce error O(m
√
d
εn ).
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A Proofs for Section 3
In this section, we prove the key technical claim from Section 3. Let p(m,n) = 12 +
m
2n +
√
1
2n ln 6
Claim A.1 (Claim 3.5, restated). For all n ≥ 931 and m ≤ n/8, if W ∼ m+ Bin(n−m, 12) and
W+ ∼ Bin(n, p(m,n)), then for any W ⊆ [n],
P
[
W+ ∈ W] ≤ 51 · P[W ∈ W] + 1
3
Claim A.1 is immediate from two intermediary claims presented below.
Claim A.2. Fix n ≥ 12849 ln 6, and 0 ≤ m ≤ n/8. If W+ ∼ Bin(n, p(m,n)), then
P
[
W+ <
n+m
2
or W+ >
n+m
2
+
√
2n ln 6
]
<
1
3
Proof. The expected value of W+ is n+m2 +
√
n ln 6
2 . From Hoeffding’s Inequality,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣W+ −
(
n+m
2
+
√
n ln 6
2
)∣∣∣∣∣ >
√
n · ln 6
2
]
<
1
3
This concludes the proof.
Claim A.3. If W ∼ m+ Bin(n−m, 12) and W+ ∼ Bin(n, p(m,n)). For all n ≥ 931, m ≤ n/8,
and 0 < k ≤ √2n ln 6,
P
[
W+ = n+m2 + k
]
P
[
W = n+m2 + k
] ≤ 51
Proof. We prove the claim by a direct calculation using the probability mass function of the binomial
distribution. As shorthand, we use p = p(m,n).
P
[
Bin(n, p) = n+m2 + k
]
P
[
m+ Bin(n−m, 12) = n+m2 + k
] = P[Bin(n, p) = n+m2 + k]
P
[
Bin(n−m, 12) = n−m2 + k
]
=
p
n+m
2
+k(1− p)n−m2 −k · n!
(n+m2 +k)!(
n−m
2
−k)!
2−(n−m) · (n−m)!
(n−m2 +k)!(
n−m
2
−k)!
= τ · n!
(
n−m
2 + k
)
!
(n−m)!(n+m2 + k)! (12)
where we introduce τ := 2n−m · pn+m2 +k · (1− p)n−m2 −k. Recall Stirling’s approximation √2piz( ze)z ≤
z! ≤ e√z( ze)z for any integer z. We will use this in order to upper bound (12).
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(12)
≤ e
2
2pi
· τ · n
n
(
n−m
2 + k
)(n−m2 +k)
(n−m)(n−m)(n+m2 + k)(n+m2 +k) ·
√
n
n−m ·
n−m
2 + k
n+m
2 + k
=
e2
2pi
· τ · n
n−m
2
−k(n−m
2 + k
)(n−m2 +k)
(n−m)(n−m)(n+m+2k2n )(n+m2 +k) ·
√
n
n−m ·
n−m
2 + k
n+m
2 + k
=
e2
2pi
· τ ·
(
n
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1
2 +
k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
(
n+m+2k
2n
)(n+m2 +k) ·
√
n
n−m ·
n−m
2 + k
n+m
2 + k
≤
√
2e4
7pi2
· τ ·
(
n
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1
2 +
k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
(
n+m+2k
2n
)(n+m2 +k) (0 ≤ m ≤ n/8)
=
√
2e4
7pi2
· 2n−m ·
(
n(1− p)
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1
2 +
k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
(
n+m+2k
2np
)(n+m2 +k)
=
√
2e4
7pi2
·
(
2n(1− p)
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1 + 2kn−m
)(n−m2 +k)
(
n+m+2k
2np
)(n+m2 +k)
=
√
2e4
7pi2
·
(
2n(1− p)
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1 +
2k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
·
(
2np
n+m+ 2k
)(n+m2 +k)
(13)
As shorthands, we use b =
√
2e4
7pi2
and c =
√
ln 6
2 :
(13)
= b ·
(
n−m− 2c√n
n−m
)n−m
2
−k
·
(
1 +
2k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
·
(
n+m+ 2c
√
n
n+m+ 2k
)(n+m2 +k)
= b ·
(
1 +
2c
√
n
n−m− 2c√n
)−(n−m2 −k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(i)
·
(
1 +
2k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(ii)
·
(
1 +
2c
√
n− 2k
n+m+ 2k
)(n+m2 +k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(iii)
(14)
For any z ∈ (0, 1), recall that z − z22 ≤ ln(1 + z) ≤ z for z ∈ (0, 1). Because our values of n,m, c
ensure that 2c
√
n
n−m−2c√n and
2k
n−m both lie in the interval (0, 1), we upper bound terms (i), (ii) in (14).
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(14, i) =
(
1 +
2c
√
n
n−m− 2c√n
)−(n−m2 −k)
= exp
(
−
(
n−m
2
− k
)
ln
(
1 +
2c
√
n
n−m− 2c√n
))
≤ exp
(
−
(
n−m
2
− k
)
·
(
2c
√
n
n−m− 2c√n −
2c2n
(n−m− 2c√n)2
))
= exp
(
−c√n · n−m− 2k
n−m− 2c√n + c
2n · n−m− 2k
(n−m− 2c√n)2
)
≤ exp
(
−c√n · n−m− 2k
n−m− 2c√n + c
2 · n−m
n−m− 2c√n
)
(15)
(14, ii) =
(
1 +
2k
n−m
)(n−m2 +k)
= exp
((
n−m
2
+ k
)
ln
(
1 +
2k
n−m
))
≤ exp
((
n−m
2
+ k
)
· 2k
n−m
)
= exp
(
k +
2k2
n−m
)
≤ exp
(
k +
2c2n
n−m
)
(16)
In the case where k ≤ c√n, the ratio 2c
√
n−2k
n+m+2k is in (0, 1). Hence,
(14, iii) =
(
1 +
2c
√
n− 2k
n+m+ 2k
)(n+m2 +k)
= exp
((
n+m
2
+ k
)
ln
(
1 +
2c
√
n− 2k
n+m+ 2k
))
≤ exp
((
n+m
2
+ k
)
· 2c
√
n− 2k
n+m+ 2k
)
= exp(−k + c√n) (17)
When c
√
n < k ≤ 2c√n, we note that (14,iii) is equivalent to
(
1 + 2k−2c
√
n
n+m+2c
√
n
)−(n+m2 +k)
. The
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ratio 2k−2c
√
n
n+m+2c
√
n
is in (0, 1)
(14, iii) =
(
1 +
2k − 2c√n
n+m+ 2c
√
n
)−(n+m2 +k)
= exp
(
−
(
n+m
2
+ k
)
ln
(
1 +
2k − 2c√n
n+m+ 2c
√
n
))
≤ exp
(
−
(
n+m
2
+ k
)(
2k − 2c√n
n+m+ 2c
√
n
− 2(k − c
√
n)2
(n+m+ 2c
√
n)2
))
= exp
(
− n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· (k − c√n) + n+m+ 2k
(n+m+ 2c
√
n)2
· (k − c√n)2
)
≤ exp
(
− n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· (k − c√n) + n+m+ 2k
(n+m+ 2c
√
n)2
· nc2
)
(k ≤ 2c√n)
< exp
(
−k + n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· c√n+ n+m+ 2k
(n+m+ 2c
√
n)2
· nc2
)
(k > c
√
n)
≤ exp
(
−k + n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· c√n+ n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· 1
4
)
≤ exp
(
−k + n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
· c√n+ 1
2
)
(18)
The final inequality comes from the upper bound on k. Because (18) dominates (17), we will
use it to form our upper bound. Taking (15), (16), (18) together, we have
(14)
≤ be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
2n
n−m +
n−m
n−m− 2c√n
)
+ c
√
n ·
(
n+m+ 2k
n+m+ 2c
√
n
− n−m− 2k
n−m− 2c√n
))
= be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
2n
n−m +
n−m
n−m− 2c√n
)
+ c
√
n · 4n(k − c
√
n)
n2 −m2 − 4c√n(m+ c√n)
)
≤ be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
2n
n−m +
n−m
n−m− 2c√n +
4n3/2
n2 −m2 − 4c√n(m+ c√n)
))
(k ≤ 2c√n)
≤ be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
16
7
+
7n
7n− 16c√n +
4n3/2
15
16n
2 − 12cn3/2 − 4c2n
))
(m ≤ n/8)
≤ be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
16
7
+
8
7
+
4n3/2
15
16n
2 − 12cn3/2 − 4c2n
))
(n ≥ (967 )2c)
≤ be1/2 · exp
(
c2 ·
(
24
7
+
1
7
))
(19)
< 51 (Defn. of b, c)
To arrive at (19), we observe that all n ≥ 931 are solutions to the quadratic inequality
4n3/2
15
16
n2− 1
2
cn3/2−4c2n ≤ 1/7. This concludes the proof.
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B Proofs for Section 4
For any integer d > 2 and algorithm R : [d] → Y, let R(U) denote the distribution over Y
induced by sampling xˆ from the uniform distribution over [d] and then sampling a message from
R(xˆ). For any set H ⊂ [d], let R(UH) denote the distribution over Y induced by sampling xˆ from
the uniform distribution over H and then executing R(xˆ). In this notation, QH,R is the algorithm
which samples from R(UH) when given +1, but samples from R(UH) when given −1.
In this section, we provide two bounds on the privacy parameter ε′ of QH,R when H is uniformly
chosen. The first bound is O(ε
√
(log(|Y| · |~R|6=))/d) (Lemma B.5), where |Y| is the size of the
message universe and |~R|6= is the number of unique randomizers. The second is O
(
ε
√
(log n)/d
)
(Lemma B.8). We note that the second bound has no dependence on the specification of the
randomizers, which may make it looser than the first bound.
The key to the analysis is to argue that, for most messages y and a uniformly random H,
the log-odds ratio ln(P[R(UH) = y]/P[R(U) = y]) is roughly ε/
√
d. To this end, we introduce the
following definition:
Definition B.1 (Leaky Messages). For any H ⊂ [d] with size d/2 and any local randomizer
R : [d]→ Y, a message y ∈ Y is v-leaky with respect to H,R when∣∣∣∣ln P[R(UH) = y]P[R(U) = y]
∣∣∣∣ > v (20)
Next we show that when y is some fixed message and H is uniformly random, y is ≈ (ε/√d)-leaky
with respect to H,R with low probability.
Claim B.2. Fix any ε > 0, any β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e2ε− 1)2 ln 2β , any ε-private R : [d]→ Y. For
any message y ∈ Y, if H is chosen uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then
P
[
y is not (e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
-leaky w.r.t. H,R
]
≥ 1− β
Proof. By the definition of leaky message, we must show that the following must hold with probability
≥ 1− β over the randomness of H.
exp
(
−(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
)
≤ P[R(UH) = y]
P[R(U) = y]
≤ exp
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
)
(21)
Observe that
P[R(U) = y] =
d∑
j=1
P[R(j) = y] · P
x∼U
[x = j]
=
d∑
j=1
P[R(j) = y] · 1
d
(Defn. of U)
Also observe that, for any fixed choice of H,
P[R(UH) = y] =
d/2∑
i=1
P[R(hi) = y] · 2
d
(By construction)
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Now we may write
P[R(UH) = y]
P[R(U) = y]
=
2
d
∑d/2
i=1 P[R(hi) = y]
1
d
∑d
j=1 P[R(j) = y]
(22)
For a uniformly random H, observe that each term in the numerator of (22) is a random variable
that lies in the interval (e−ε maxj P[R(j) = y], eε maxj P[R(j) = y]), due to the ε-privacy guarantee
of R. We use the following version of Hoeffding’s inequality for samples without replacement.
Lemma B.3 ([Hoe63]). Given a set ~p = {p1, . . . , pN} ∈ RN such that pi ∈ (c, c′), if the subset
~x = {x1, . . . , xn} is constructed by uniformly sampling without replacement from ~p, then
P
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
pi + (c
′ − c) ·
√
1
2n
log
1
β
]
≥ 1− β
Hence, the following is true with probability 1− β/2:
(22) ≤
1
d
∑d
j=1 P[R(j) = y] + (eε maxj P[R(j) = y]− e−ε maxj P[R(j) = y])
√
1
d ln
2
β
1
d
∑d
j=1 P[R(j) = y]
= 1 + (eε − e−ε)
√
ln
2
β
·
√
d ·maxj P[R(j) = y]∑d
j=1 P[R(j) = y]
≤ 1 + (eε − e−ε)
√
ln
2
β
·
√
d ·maxj P[R(j) = y]
d ·minj P[R(j) = y]
= 1 + (eε − e−ε)
√
1
d
ln
2
β
· maxj P[R(j) = y]
minj P[R(j) = y]
≤ 1 + (e2ε − 1)
√
1
d
ln
2
β
(R is ε-private)
≤ exp
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
1
d
ln
2
β
)
(23)
By a completely symmetric argument, the following holds with probability 1− β/2:
(22) ≥ 1− (e2ε − 1)
√
1
d
ln
2
β
≥ exp
(
−(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
)
(24)
(24) follows from the condition that d > 4(e2ε − 1)2 ln 2β . (21) follows from (23) and (24) (through a
union bound). This concludes the proof.
Now we apply Claim B.2 to analyze the privacy of any QH,Ri .
B.1 A protocol-dependent bound on ε′
Our first bound on the privacy parameters will be dependent on the structure of the initial
randomizers R1, . . . , Rn from which the new randomizers QH,R1 , . . . , QH,Rn are derived. We use |Y|
to denote the size of the message universe and |~R|6= to denote the number of unique randomizers.
The following is immediate from Claim B.2 by applying a union bound over all the unique
randomizers in ~R and the message universe Y:
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Corollary B.4. Fix any vector of ε-private randomizers ~R = (R1, . . . , Rn) (where every randomizer
has the form Ri : [d]→ Y) and any d > 4(e2ε − 1)2 ln(12|Y| · |~R|6=). Sample H uniformly at random
over subsets of [d] with size d/2. The following is true with probability ≥ 5/6 over the randomness
of H:
∀y ∈ Y ∀i ∈ [n] y is not
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln 12|Y| · |~R|6=
)
-leaky w.r.t. H,Ri
Lemma B.5. Fix any ε-locally private protocol Π = (~R,A) (where every randomizer has the form
Ri : [d] → Y) and d > 4(e2ε − 1)2 ln(12|Y| · |~R|6=). Sample H uniformly at random over subsets
of [d] with size d/2. The following is true with probability ≥ 2/3 over the randomness of H: all
randomizers {QH,Ri}i∈[n] specified by Algorithm 2 satisfy ε′-privacy, where
ε′ = (e2ε − 1)
√
16
d
ln
(
12|Y| · |~R|6=
)
Proof. From Corollary B.4, all possible outputs of all randomizers are not leaky with probability
≥ 5/6. More formally, for every y ∈ Y and i ∈ [n],∣∣∣∣ln P[Ri(UH) = y]P[Ri(U) = y]
∣∣∣∣ < ε′/2
By identical reasoning, with probability ≥ 5/6,∣∣∣∣∣ln P
[
Ri(UH) = y
]
P[Ri(U) = y]
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε′/2
Recall the definition of QH,Ri : on input +1, it samples from Ri(UH) and, on input −1, it
samples from Ri(UH). From a union bound, we can conclude that the log-odds ratio is at most ε
′
with probability ≥ 2/3. This concludes the proof.
B.2 A protocol-independent bound on ε′
In this subsection, we obtain a bound on the amplified privacy that depends on the number of
users in the protocol but not on the specification of the randomizers ~R. If H is drawn uniformly
and d is sufficiently large, then for most users, the probability that Ri(U) is a leaky message is
small. Let Leak(v,H,R) = {y ∈ Y | y is v-leaky with respect to H,R}
Claim B.6. Fix any ε > 0, any β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e2ε− 1)2 ln 2β , and any n algorithms R1 . . . Rn
that are ε-private. If H is sampled uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following
holds with probability ≥ 5/6 over the randomness of H:
∀i ∈ [n] P
[
Ri(U) ∈ Leak
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
,H,Ri
)]
< 6βn (25)
Proof. To prove the claim, we show that for every i ∈ [n], with probability at least 1− 1/6n over
the randomness of H,
P
[
Ri(U) ∈ Leak
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
,H,Ri
)]
< 6βn (26)
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Below, we use
( [d]
d/2
)
as shorthand for the subsets of [d] with size d/2. We bound the expectation
of the random variable:
E
H
[P[Ri(U) ∈ Leak(. . . , H,Ri)]] =
∑
H∈( [d]d/2)
(
d
d/2
)−1
· P[Ri(U) ∈ Leak(. . . , H,Ri)]
=
∑
H∈( [d]d/2)
(
d
d/2
)−1
·
∑
y∈Y
1[y ∈ Leak(. . . , H,Ri)] · P[Ri(U) = y]
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
H∈( [d]d/2)
(
d
d/2
)−1
· 1[y ∈ Leak(. . . , H,Ri)] · P[Ri(U) = y]
≤
∑
y∈Y
β · P[Ri(U) = y] (Claim B.2)
= β
Markov’s inequality implies that (26) holds with probability ≥ 1− 1/6n.
(25) is a bound on the probability that Ri(U) is leaky. Because ~R satisfies differential privacy,
(25) implies a bound on the probability that Ri(UH) is leaky.
Corollary B.7. Fix any ε > 0, any β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e2ε − 1)2 ln 2β , and any n algorithms
R1 . . . Rn that are ε-private. If H is sampled uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the
following holds with probability ≥ 5/6 over the randomness of H:
∀i ∈ [n] P
[
Ri(U) ∈ Leak
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
,H,Ri
)]
< 6βn
∀i ∈ [n] P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Leak
(
(e2ε − 1)
√
4
d
ln
2
β
,H,Ri
)]
< 6eεβn
The algorithm QH,Ri reports either a sample from Ri(UH) or from Ri(UH). Having bounded
the probability that either sample is leaky, we can now argue that QH,Ri satisfies approximate
differential privacy.
Lemma B.8. Fix any ε > 0, any δ, β ∈ (0, 1), any d > 4(e2ε−1)2 ln(12eεn/δ), and any n algorithms
that are ε-private. If H is sampled uniformly from subsets of [d] with size d/2, then the following
holds with probability > 2/3 over the randomness of H: all randomizers {QH,Ri}i∈[n] specified by
Algorithm 2 satisfy (ε′, δ)-privacy, where ε′ = (e2ε − 1)
√
16
d ln(24e
εn/δ).
Proof. Define β = δ/(12eεn) so that ε′ = (e2ε − 1)
√
16
d ln(2/β). For every Y ⊆ Y, the following
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holds with probability > 5/6 by Corollary B.7.
P[Ri(UH) ∈ Y ] = P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y − Leak(ε′/2, H,Ri)
]
+ P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y ∩ Leak(ε′/2, H,Ri)
]
≤ P[Ri(UH) ∈ Y − Leak(ε′/2, H,Ri)]+ 6βeεn (Corollary B.7)
= P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y − Leak(ε′/2, H,Ri)
]
+ δ/2 (Value of β)
=
∑
y∈Y−Leak(ε′/2)
P[Ri(UH) = y] + δ/2
≤
∑
y∈Y−Leak(ε′/2)
exp(ε′/2) · P[Ri(U) = y] + δ/2 (Defn. B.1)
≤ exp(ε′/2) · P[Ri(U) ∈ Y ] + δ/2
P[Ri(U) ∈ Y ] ≤ exp(ε′/2) · P[Ri(UH) ∈ Y ] + δ/2 (Symmetric steps)
We take identical steps to show that the following holds with probability > 5/6 as well:
P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y
] ≤ exp(ε′/2) · P[Ri(U) ∈ Y ] + δ/2
P[Ri(U) ∈ Y ] ≤ exp(ε′/2) · P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y
]
+ δ/2
From basic composition and a union bound, the following holds with probability > 2/3:
P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y
] ≤ exp(ε′) · P[Ri(UH) ∈ Y ] + δ
P[Ri(UH) ∈ Y ] ≤ exp(ε′) · P
[
Ri(UH) ∈ Y
]
+ δ
Recall that QH,Ri samples from Ri(UH) on input +1 and from Ri(UH) on input −1. Hence, QH,Ri
satisfies ε′, δ privacy. This concludes the proof.
C Construction and Analysis of Protocols from Section 5
C.1 Construction and Analysis of EST∞
The protocol EST∞n,d,ε consists of the n randomizers (REST∞n,d,ε,i)i∈[n] and the aggregator AEST∞n,d,ε ;
see Algorithms 3 and 4 for the pseudocode. A public partition of [n] into d groups, denoted pi, is
drawn uniformly.
An important subroutine is described by (27). It samples from ±1 in such a way that the mean
is equal to the jth coordinate of user data xi.
Encode∞(xi, j) :=
{
+1 with probability 12 +
xi,j
2
−1 with probability 12 −
xi,j
2
(27)
The following statement is a version of Theorem 5.2 that allows for arbitrary failure probability.
Theorem C.1. For any β ∈ (0, 1), there is a constant c such that, for any ε > 0, any positive
integers m ≤ n, any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd∞, and any attacker M oblivious to public randomness:
P
[∥∥∥∥∥Manip(EST∞n,d,ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
< c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
d
n
log
d
β
+
m
n
)]
≥ 1− β
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Algorithm 3: REST∞n,d,ε,i(xi, pi)
Parameters: n, d ∈ Z+, ε > 0, i ∈ [n]
Input: xi ∈ Bd∞; pi, a public partition of [n] into d groups
Output: yi ∈ {− eε+1eε−1 , e
ε+1
eε−1}
g(i)← the group i belongs to in pi
x′i ← Encode∞(xi, g(i))
yi ← RRR(x′i)
Return yi
Algorithm 4: AEST∞n,d,ε (y1, . . . , yn, pi)
Parameters: n, d ∈ Z+, ε > 0
Input: ~y ∈ {− eε+1eε−1 , e
ε+1
eε−1}n; pi, a public partition of [n] into d groups
Output: ~z ∈ Rd
For g : 1→ d
pi(g)← the gth group of [n]
zg ← dn
∑
i∈pi(g) yi
Return ~z
To prove the theorem, we bound the error introduced by each source of randomness. We first
consider the difference between the underlying mean and the mean in a subsample. Hoeffding’s
inequality and a union bound yields the following claim:
Claim C.2. Fix any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd∞. There is a constant c such that, when pi is a uniformly
random partition of [n] into d groups pi(1), . . . , pi(d),
P
∀g ∈ [d]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
xi,g − d
n
∑
i∈pi(g)
xi,g
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < c ·
√
d
n
ln
d
β
 ≥ 1− β
When we encode all xi,g(i) with Encode∞, we may use the Hoeffding inequality again to bound
the error:
Claim C.3. Fix any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd∞ and any partition pi of [n] into d groups pi(1), . . . , pi(d).
Suppose, for every g ∈ [d], we execute x′i ← Encode∞(xi, g) for each user i ∈ pi(g).
P
∀g ∈ [d]
∣∣∣∣∣∣dn
∑
i∈pi(g)
xi,g − d
n
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < c ·
√
d
n
ln
d
β
 ≥ 1− β
If an attacker chooses the set of corrupt users C independently of pi, we use a Chernoff bound to
bound the number of corruptions in any group:
Claim C.4. Fix any n, d ∈ Z+ and any set of corrupted users C ⊂ [n] where |C| = m. There is a
constant c such that, when pi is a uniformly random partition of [n] into d groups pi(1), . . . , pi(d),
P
[
∀g ∈ [d] |C ∩ pi(g)| < m
d
+ c ·
√
m
d
ln
d
β
]
≥ 1− β
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When we apply randomized response to data encoded by Encode∞, we can obtain our third
bound on error immediately from Theorem 5.1:
Claim C.5. For any m′ ≤ n/d, any ~x ′ ∈ {±1}n/d and any attacker M , RRε/2,n/d has the following
guarantee on estimation error after playing the (m′, n/d)-manipulation game:
P
∣∣∣∣∣∣Manipm′,n/d(RRε,n/d, ~x′,M)− dn
n/d∑
i=1
x′i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
2d
n
ln
2d
β
+
2dm′
n
) ≥ 1− β/d
Theorem 5.2 follows from union bounds over Claims C.2, C.3, C.4, and C.5 (we substitute m′ in
Claim C.5 with the upper bound in Claim C.4).
C.2 Construction and Analysis of EST1
The protocol EST1n,d,ε consists of the n randomizers (R
EST1
n,d,ε,i)i∈[n] and the aggregator A
EST1
n,d,ε (see
Algorithms 6 and 7, respectively). The vector for each user i, ~si ∈ {±1}2d+1, is sampled uniformly
and independently.
Algorithm 5: Encoded1(x)
Parameters: d ∈ Z+
Input: x ∈ Bd1
Output: x′ ∈ [2d+ 1]
For j ∈ [d]
If xj > 0 :
p2j−1 ← xj
p2j ← 0
Else
p2j−1 ← 0
p2j ← −xj
p2d+1 ← 1− ‖x‖1
Sample x′ from the distribution over [2d+ 1] such that P[x′ = k] = pk
Return x′
Algorithm 6: REST1n,d,ε,i(xi, ~si)
Parameters: n, d ∈ Z+, ε > 0, i ∈ [n]
Input: x ∈ Bd1 and ~si ∈ {±1}2d+1
Output: y ∈ {± eε+1eε−1}
x′i ← Encoded1(xi)
yi ← RRRε (si,x′)
Return yi
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Algorithm 7: AEST1n,d (y1, ~s1, . . . , yn, ~sn)
Parameters: n, d ∈ Z+
Input: yi ∈ {± eε+1eε−1} and ~si ∈ {±1}2d+1 for every i ∈ [n]
Output: µˆ ∈ Rd
For j′ ∈ [2d+ 1]
zj′ ← 1n
∑n
i=1 yisi,j′
For j ∈ [d]
µˆj ← z2j−1 − z2j
µˆ← (µˆ1, . . . , µˆd)
Return µˆ
C.2.1 Error in `∞
Theorem C.6. There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers
n, d, and any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [d]n, with probability ≥ 1− β, we have∥∥∥∥∥EST1n,d,ε(~x)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
√
1
n
ln
d
β
To prove the theorem, we bound the error introduced by Encoded∞ and by RRRε separately. Recall
the shorthand freq(j, ~x) := 1n
∑n
i=1 1[xi = j] and freq(~x) := (freq(1, ~x), . . . , freq(d, ~x)).
Claim C.7. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd1 ,
if we sample x′i ← Encoded1(xi) for each user i, then
P
[
max
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣(freq(2j − 1, ~x ′)− freq(2j, ~x ′))− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi,j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c ·
√
1
n
ln
d
β
]
≥ 1− β
Proof. Consider any user data xi ∈ Bd1 and any coordinate j ∈ [d]. Without loss of generality, we
will assume that xi,j > 0. By construction, P[x′i = 2j − 1] = xi and P[x′i = 2j] = 0. Hence,
E
[
1
[
x′i = 2j − 1
]− 1[x′i = 2j]] = xi,j
E
[
n∑
i=1
1
[
x′i = 2j − 1
]− n∑
i=1
1
[
x′i = 2j
]]
=
n∑
i=1
xi,j
E
[
freq(2j − 1, ~x ′)− freq(2j, ~x ′)] = 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi,j
The random variable 1[x′i = 2j − 1]−1[x′i = 2j]−xi,j ranges from −2 to +2. By a Hoeffding bound,
the following holds with probability ≥ 1− β/d.∣∣∣∣∣freq(2j − 1, ~x ′)− freq(2j, ~x ′)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi,j
∣∣∣∣∣ <
√
8
n
ln
2d
β
A union bound over all j ∈ [d] completes the proof.
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Claim C.8. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x′1, . . . , x′n ∈ [2d+1],
if we sample yi ← RRRε (si,x′i) for each user i and compute zj′ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yisi,j′ for each j
′ ∈ [2d+ 1],
then
P
[∥∥~z − freq(~x ′)∥∥∞ ≤ c · eε + 1eε − 1 ·
√
1
n
ln
d
β
]
≥ 1− β
Proof. To prove this claim, we fix a value j′ ∈ [2d+ 1] and argue that the estimate of freq(j′, ~x ′)
has error c · eε+1eε−1 ·
√
1
n ln
d
β with probability 1− β/(2d+ 1). A union bound over all j′ ∈ [2d+ 1] will
complete the proof.
Recall that all yi have magnitude
eε+1
eε−1 . By a Hoeffding bound, the following holds with
probability ≥ 1− β/(2d+ 1) (where we use ~s(j′) to denote the vector (s1,j′ , . . . , sn,j′):∣∣∣∣zj′ − ERRR,~s(j′)[zj′]
∣∣∣∣ < eε + 1eε − 1 ·
√
2
n
ln
2(2d+ 1)
β
It remains to show that zj′ is unbiased:
E
RRR,~s(j′)
[
zj′
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
RRR,~s(j′)
[
yisi,j′
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
~s(j′)
[
si,j′ · si,xi
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
1
[
xi = j
′] = freq(j′, ~x ′)
This concludes the proof.
We also formalize the argument that m users cannot manipulate the protocol beyond O(m/εn):
Theorem C.9. There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers
m,n, d, any attacker M , and any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [d]n, with probability ≥ 1− β, we have∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n(EST1n,d,ε, ~x,M)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n
ln
d
β
+
m
n
)
Proof. As sketched in Section 5, we bound the error from the honest execution separately from the
error from the manipulation. Given that Theorem C.6 already bounds the honest execution, it will
suffice to prove that
max
j∈[2d+1]
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n∑
i∈C
(yi − yi)si,j′
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 · eε + 1eε − 1 · mn
By construction, both the manipulative messages yi and the honest messages yi are members of the
set {± eε+1eε−1}. There are m corrupt users in C. Hence, the bound follows.
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C.2.2 Error in `1
Theorem C.10. There is a constant c such that, for any β ∈ (0, 1), any ε > 0, any positive integers
n, d, and any ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [d]n, with probability ≥ 1− β, we have∥∥∥∥∥EST1n,d,ε(~x)− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
√
d2
n
log
1
β
To prove the theorem, we bound the error introduced by Encoded∞ and by RRRε separately.
Claim C.11. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x1, . . . , xn ∈ Bd1 ,
if we sample x′i ← Encoded1(xi) for each user i, then the following holds with probability ≥ 1− β:∑
j∈[d]
∣∣∣∣∣(freq(2j − 1, ~x′)− freq(2j, ~x′))− 1n
n∑
i=1
xi,j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c ·
√
d2
n
log
1
β
(28)
Proof. For any i ∈ [n], j ∈ [d], define the random variable err(i, j) := 1[x′i = 2j − 1]− 1[x′i = 2j]−
xi,j . Observe that E[err(i, j)] = 0 and |err(i, j)| ≤ 2. By Hoeffding’s inequality, the quantity
1
n
∑n
i=1 err(i, j) is subgaussian. Specifically, for all t > 0,
P
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
err(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣ > t
]
≤ 2 exp(−nt2/8) (29)
Note that this implies there are constants c0, c1 such that
E
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
err(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ c0 ·
√
1
n
(30)
Var
[∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
err(i, j)
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤ c1 · 1
n
(31)
For shorthand, we define err(j) :=
∣∣ 1
n
∑n
i=1 err(i, j)
∣∣ ≤ 2. Observe that the left-hand side of (28)
is equivalent to
∑d
j=1 err(j). From (30), (30), and a Chernoff bound, the sum tightly concentrated
around its expectation:
P
 d∑
j=1
err(j) > d · E[err(1)] +
√
dVar[err(1)] log
1
β
 ≤ β
P
 d∑
j=1
err(j) > c0 ·
√
d2
n
+
√
c1 · d
n
log
1
β
 ≤ β (From (30) and (31))
This concludes the proof.
Claim C.12. There is a constant c such that for any positive integers n, d and any x′1, . . . , x′n ∈
[2d + 1], if we sample yi ← RRRε (si,x′i) for each user i and compute zj′ = 1n
∑n
i=1 yisi,j′ for each
j′ ∈ [2d+ 1], then the following holds with probability ≥ 1− β∑
j′∈[2d+1]
∣∣zj′ − freq(j′, ~x′)∣∣ ≤ c · eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
√
d2
n
log
1
β
Proof. Define the random variable err(i, j′) := yisi,j′ − 1[x′i = j′]. The same steps taken in the
proof of Claim C.11 apply here, except now |err(i, j′)| ≤ 2 · eε+1eε−1 .
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C.3 Construction and Analysis of RAPTOR
The protocol RAPTORn,G,ε consists of G randomizers: user i is assigned randomizer di/Ge. Public
randomness will generate S1, . . . , SG each of which are uniformly random subsets of [d] of size d/2.
If a user runs the g-th randomizer, they will privately report whether or not their data lies in Sg.
The aggregator performs a threshold test on each group.
We reproduce the randomizer and aggregator pseudocode in Algorithms 8 and 9. For the sake
of this proof, we use 1±[bool ] to denote the indicator function that evaluates to +1 when bool is
true and −1 when it false.
Algorithm 8: RRAPTORε,g , randomizer for uniformity testing
Parameters: Privacy parameter ε; group number g ∈ [G]
Input: x ∈ [d]; public sets S1, . . . , SG where Sg ⊂ [d] and |Sg| = d/2
Output: y ∈ {± eε+1eε−1}
x′ ← 1±[x ∈ Sg]
y ∼ RRRε (x′)
Return y
Algorithm 9: ARAPTORn,G,ε , an aggregation algorithm for uniformity testing
Parameters: Positive integers n,G; privacy parameter ε
Input: y1, . . . yn ∈ {± eε+1eε−1}n; public sets S1, . . . , SG
Output: The string “Uniform” or the string “Not Uniform”
αG :=
eε+1
eε−1 ·
(√
6G
n ln
4G
β +
2mG
n
)
For g ∈ [G]
start(g)← 1 + (g − 1) · n/G
end(g)← g · n/G
/* Estimate of probability mass in Sg */
p˜(Sg)← Gn
∑end(g)
i=start(g) yi
If |p˜(Sg)| > 2αG :
Return “Not uniform”
Return “Uniform”
We rely on the following technical lemma concerning uniformly random S:
Lemma C.13 (From [ACFT19]). If S is a uniformly random subset of [d] with size d/2 and
‖P−U‖1 > α
√
10d, then
P
S
[∣∣1
2
− P
x∼P
[x ∈ S]∣∣ > α] > 1
477
Corollary C.14. If S is a uniformly random subset of [d] with size d/2 and ‖P−U‖1 > α
√
10d,
then
P
S
[∣∣ E
x∼P
[1±[x ∈ S]]
∣∣ > 2α] > 1
477
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The following statement is a version of Theorem 5.9 that allows for arbitrary failure probability
β.
Theorem. There is a constant c and a choice of parameter G = Θ(log 1/β) such that, for any ε > 0,
any positive integers m ≤ n, and any attacker M , the following holds with probability ≥ 1− β
Manipm,n(RAPTORn,G,ε,U,M) = “uniform”
and, when ‖P−U‖1 ≥ c · e
ε+1
eε−1 ·
(√
dG
n ln
G
β +
mG
√
d
n
)
, the following also holds with probability
≥ 1− β
Manipm,n(RAPTORn,G,ε,P,M) = “not uniform”
Proof. We specify the following undesirable events:
E1 := ∃g ∈ [G]
∣∣ E
x∼P
[1±[x ∈ S]]− G
n
end(g)∑
i=start(g)
1±[xi ∈ S]
∣∣ > αG
E2 := ∃g ∈ [G]
∣∣G
n
∑
1±[xi ∈ S]− p˜(Sg)
∣∣ > αG
E2 := ∀g ∈ [G]
∣∣ E
x∼P
[1±[x ∈ S]]
∣∣ < 2αG
If P = U and neither E1 nor E2 have occurred, every p˜(Sg) is at most 2αG. Thus, the output is
“Uniform.”
If ‖P−U‖1 ≥ αG ·
√
160d and none of E1, E2, E3 have occurred, some p˜(Sg) has magnitude at
least 2αG. Thus, the output is “Not uniform.”
P[E1] < β/3 follows from a Hoeffding bound. P[E2] < β/3 follows from Theorem 5.1 and a
union bound over G plays of RRn/G,ε in the manipulation game. When ‖P−U‖1 ≥
√
160d · αG
and G← dln(2/β)/ ln(477/476)e, P[E3] < β/3 follows from Corollary C.14. A union bound over all
three completes the proof.
C.4 Construction and Analysis of HH
The protocol HHn,d,k,ε consists of the n randomizers (R
HH
n,d,k,ε,i)i∈[n] and the aggregator A
HH
n,d,k,ε;
see Algorithms 11 and 12 for the pseudocode. A public data structure pi partitions [n] into log2 d
groups uniformly at random. We assume the data structure has an implicit order within each group
pi(1), . . . , pi(log2 d). The public hash function h : [d]→ [k] is drawn uniformly. To facilitate the use
of EST1, we also sample vectors ~s1, . . . , ~sn uniformly from {±1}2k.
Algorithm 10: OneHotHashh,k(g, xi)
/* One-hot vector that encodes a hashed value */
x′i ← (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
2k copies
)
hg(x)← 2h(x)− bit(g, xi)
x′i,hg(x) ← +1
Return x′i
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Algorithm 11: RHHn,d,k,ε,i(xi, pi, h,~si)
Parameters: n, d, k ∈ Z+; ε > 0; i ∈ [n]
Input: xi ∈ [d]; public partition pi; public hash h : [d]→ [k]; public vector ~s ∈ {±1}2k
Output: yi ∈ {± eε+1eε−1}
g(i)← group that i belongs to in pi
x′i ← OneHotHashh,k(g(i), xi)
/* Contribute to a histogram by reporting the one-hot */
n′ ← n/ log2 d
i′ ← index of i in group g(i)
yi ∼ REST1n′,2k,ε,i′(x′i, ~si)
Return yi
Algorithm 12: AHHn,d,k,ε(y1, ~s1, . . . , yn, ~sn, pi, h)
Parameters: n, d, k ∈ Z+; ε > 0
Input: yi ∈ {± eε+1eε−1} and ~si ∈ {±1}2k for each i ∈ [n]; public partition pi; public hash
h : [d]→ [k]
Output: L ⊂ [d] with size k
n′ ← n/ log2 d
For g : 1→ log2 d
/* Obtain the g-th noisy histogram */
(z
(g)
1 , . . . , z
(g)
2k )← AEST1n′,2k,ε({yi, ~si}i∈pi(g))
L← ∅
For v ∈ [k]
/* Recover the bits of an element in [d] that hashes to v */
For g : 1→ log2 d
If z
(g)
2v−1 > z
(g)
2v : bit
(g)
v ← 1 ;
Else bit
(g)
v ← 0 ;
L← L ∪ the number represented in binary by bit (1)v , . . . , bit (log2 d)v
Return L
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Theorem C.15. There is a constant c such that, for any ε > 0, any positive integers m ≤ n, any
~x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ [d]n, and any adversary M , if we execute L ← Manipm,n(HHn,k,ε, ~x,M) with
parameter k ← 3n2/β, then with probability ≥ 1− β, L contains all j such that
freq(j, ~x) > c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
log d
n
log
n log d
β
)
+
m log d
n
As discussed in Section 5.4, there are three undesirable events that can occur when the game is
played. in three separate claims below, we state them formally and bound the probability of each
event by β/3. We first consider the event that the frequency of any j ∈ ~x is significantly different
from the frequency of j ∈ ~x(g):
Claim C.16. Fix any ~x ∈ [d]n. There is a constant c such that, when pi is a uniformly random
partition of [n] into groups pi(1), . . . , pi(log2 d) each of size n/ log2 d,
P
[
∀j ∈ ~x ∀g ∈ [log2 d] |freq(j, ~x)− freq(j, ~x(g))| > c ·
√
log2 d
n
ln
n · log2 d
β
]
≤ β/3
This is proven via a Hoeffding bound and a union bound. Next we argue that there are likely no
collisions:
Claim C.17. If k > 3n2/β, then for any ~x ∈ [d]n and a uniformly chosen h : [d]→ [k],
P
[∃x 6= x′ ∈ ~x h(x) = h(x′)] ≤ β/3
Proof. The argument is brief:
P
[∃x 6= x′ ∈ ~x h(x) = h(x′)] ≤ n · P[∃x 6= x1 h(x) = h(x1)]
≤ n2 · P[h(x2) = h(x1)]
=
n2
k
< β/3
A core part of the protocol is, for each group g, the execution of EST1n′,2k,ε on one-hot encodings
(x′i)i∈pi(g). Theorem C.9 implies the following:
Claim C.18. Fix any m < n′, ~x ′ ∈ (B2k1 )n
′
, any adversary M against EST1n′,2k,ε, and any
β ∈ (0, 1). There exists a constant c such that
P
[∥∥∥∥∥Manipm,n′(EST1n′,2k,ε, ~x ′′,M)− 1n′
n′∑
i=1
x′i
∥∥∥∥∥
∞
> c · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k
β
)
+
m
n′
]
≤ β/3
We are now ready to prove Theorem C.15
Proof of Theorem C.15. Let c0, c1 be the constants from Claims C.16 and C.18, respectively. We
will prove that with probability ≥ 1− β, for each g ∈ [log2 d] and for each j such that
freq(j, ~x) > c0 ·
√
log2 d
n
ln
n · log2 d
β
+ 2c1 · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(32)
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the protocol will reconstruct the g-th bit of j.
Each user constructs x′i ← OneHotHashh,k(g(i), xi) when running RHH on their data. A union
bound over Claims C.16 and C.17 implies the following two inequalities hold for all groups g (with
probability 1− 2β/3):
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)−bit(g,j) ≥ freq(j, ~x)− c0 ·
√
log2 d
n
ln
n · log2 d
β
(33)
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1 = 0 (34)
From Claim C.18, the following two inequalities hold for all g (with probability 1− β/3):
|z(g)2·h(j)−bit(g,j) −
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)−bit(g,j)| ≤ c1 ·
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(35)
|z(g)2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1 −
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1| ≤ c1 ·
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(36)
By a union bound, the following holds with probability ≥ 1− β:
z
(g)
2·h(j)−bit(g,j) ≥
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)−bit(g,j) − c1 ·
eε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(From (35))
≥ freq(j, ~x)− c0 ·
√
log2 d
n
ln
n · log2 d
β
− c1 · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(From (33))
> c1 · e
ε + 1
eε − 1 ·
(√
1
n′
ln
k log2 d
β
+
m
n′
)
(From (32))
≥ z(g)2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1 +
1
n′
∑
i∈pi(g)
x′i,2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1 (From (36))
= z
(g)
2·h(j)+bit(g,j)−1 (From (34))
By construction, this means we will assign bit
(g)
h(j) ← bit(g, j). this concludes the proof.
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